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AGAINST POPULIST ISOLATIONISM: NEW ASIAN REGIONALISM AND 
GLOBAL SOUTH POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
PASHA L. HSIEH* 
Abstract 
This article provides the most up-to-date examination of the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP), which is poised to become the world’s largest free trade agreement (FTA).  
It argues that the 16-country mega-FTA will galvanize the paradigm shift in Asian regionalism 
and build a normative foundation for the Global South in international economic law.  Based on 
intertwined theoretical and substantive claims, this article opens an inquiry into the assertive 
legalism of developing nations in the new regional economic order.  It further manifests the pivotal 
force of emerging economies against populist isolationism in the Trump era that undermines the 
neoliberal foundation of global trade liberalization. 
By analyzing the converging policies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
China and India, the article first demonstrates the status of the RCEP in Asian powers’ 
contemporary FTA practice.  In light of the ASEAN Economic Community, the new 11-member 
Trans-Pacific Partnership and EU FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, caution should be given to 
the utilization of tariff preferences, services liberalization and investor-state dispute settlement.  
Finally, the article assesses the RCEP’s systemic impact on the legal fragmentation due to 
jurisdictional conflicts under trade and investment agreements.  The consolidation of divergent 
trade rules and the pro-development operative mechanism will fortify the RCEP as a pathway to 
the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and reinvigorate the multilateral trading system. 
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I. Introduction 
International economic law and the Global South are at a crossroads in the era of populist 
isolationism.1  The resurgence of Westphalian sovereignty in economic policy has endangered the 
neoliberal basis of free trade that has underpinned the world’s development since the inception of 
the postwar Bretton Woods system.2  Evolving mega-regionals were once perceived to remedy the 
long-standing impasse of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Nevertheless, 
the globalization backlash, evidenced by Brexit and the Trump administration’s withdrawal from 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), has invigorated developing countries to pursue a new 
normative foundation for economic integration.3 
                                                          
1 See Arif Dirlik, Global South: Predicament and Promise, 1:1 GLOBAL SOUTH 12, 12-15 (2007) (analyzing the notion 
of the Third World and the South); Deniz Altınbaş, South-South Cooperation: A Counter-Hegemonic Movement? in 
THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL, GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRENDS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 29, 
29 fn 1 (Justin Dargin ed. 2013) (clarifying the North-South divide in global politics). 
2 For the nexus between sovereignty and emerging trade protectionism, see Wallace S. Cheng, To Open up Global 
Trade We Need to Understand “Protectionism,” June 13, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/global-
trade-protectionism-g20-explained/; Douglas A. Irwin, The False Promise of Protectionism: Why Trump’s Trade 
Policy Could Backfire, 96:3 FOREIGN AFF. 45, 45-53 (2017). 
3 The impact of Brexit and the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) on Asian states, see Hoang 
Thi Ha et. al., ASEAN’s Reflections from Brexit, 9 ASEAN FOCUS 19, 20-21 (2016); Marina Tsirbas et. al., The Future 
of the TPP, 11 ASEAN FOCUS 8, 10-15 (2016).   
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Trade nationalism across the Atlantic has not deterred the dynamic development of Asian 
regionalism, which is witnessing a nearly four-fold growth of free trade agreements (FTAs) that 
represent half of global trade pacts.4  A salient feature of the Asian FTAs is the transformation of 
conventional South-South geopolitical cooperation into new-generation economic instruments.  As 
the most ambitious mega-regional agreement led by the Global South, the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is poised to be the world’s largest FTA in 2018.5   
Built upon the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) FTAs, the 16 RCEP countries 
account for 32% of world goods exports and 28% of global gross domestic product (GDP).6  
Incorporating the world’s ten most vigorous economies, including ASEAN states, China and India, 
contributes to the bloc’s GDP growth rate of 4.6%, which is more than double that of the United 
States or the European Union.7  More fundamentally, the RCEP agenda will converge fragmented 
trade rules and the economic priorities of Asia’s powerhouses, such as the ASEAN centrality, 
Beijing’s “One Belt One Road” (OBOR) initiative and New Delhi’s Act East Policy.8   
                                                          
4 The number of Asian free trade agreements (FTAs) in effect increased from 39 to 147 from 2000 to 2017.  Table 1. 
FTAs by Status (cumulative), https://aric.adb.org/fta (last visited June 28, 2017); see also Regional Trade Agreements, 
https://www.wto.org/english/Tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited June 28, 2017) (“As of 5 May 2017, 274 
RTAs were in force.”). 
5 Joint Leaders’ Statement on the Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (2017), 
at 1; Giovanni Di Lieto, Understanding RCEP in Xi Jinping’s World Trade Game, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 27, 2017., 
http://www.atimes.com/understanding-rcep-xi-jinpings-world-trade-game/; Rebecca Fatima Sta Maria, RCEP More 
Relevant Now Than Ever, STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 18, 2017, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/rcep-more-relevant-
now-than-ever. 
6 External free trade agreements (FTAs) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were concluded 
between ten ASEAN states collectively with China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India and Hong Kong.  
Sanchita Basu Das et. al., Can ASEAN+1 FTAs Be a Pathway towards Negotiating and Designing the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement? 50:2 J. WORLD TRADE 253, 254-60 (2016); Yoshifumi 
Fukunaga & Ikumo Isono, Taking ASEAN+1 FTAs towards the RCEP: A Mapping Study, ERIA Discussion Paper 
Series (2013), at 4-6; ASEAN Connections (2016), at 13.  As a comparison, 11 TPP members and the United States 
encompass 26% of world goods exports and 32% of global gross domestic product (GDP).  ASEAN Connections 
(2016), at 12. 
7 The Long View: How Will the Global Economic Order Change by 2050? (2017), at 7; ERIA East Asia Updates, 
Special 2017 Annual Edition (2017), at 1; ASEAN Connections (2016), at 12-13. 
8 See Zhao Hong, China One Belt One Road: An Overview of the Debate, 6 Trends in Southeast Asia 1, 1-30 
(investigating current economic policies of ASEAN, China and India). 
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Double the economic scale of the “reborn” TPP, which is the now 11-party Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the RCEP will be the most 
critical milestone since the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989.9  
To a large extent, premature aspirations for the TPP have overshadowed academic and policy 
discourse on the RCEP.  To fill a much-needed gap in legal literature, this article offers a timely 
and “on the ground” response to the systemic implications of the RCEP for international economic 
law.  By making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, the article opens an inquiry into 
the assertive legalism of developing countries in the new regional economic order (NREO).10  The 
new-generation South-South FTAs that underpin the NREO also manifest the pivotal role of 
Global South powers in reshaping world order amid populist isolationism in the Trump era. 
This article argues that the emerging RCEP represents the NREO, which will prompt paradigm 
shifts in Asian regionalism and construct a normative foundation for the Global South in 
international economic law.  It further contends that revolutionizing the RCEP as Asia’s economic 
framework mandates commitments beyond ASEAN+1 FTAs and the new ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC).  The roadmap, which takes into account of the nexus between the AEC 
                                                          
9 Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement (2017) [TPP Statement], at 1; see Minister Champagne Welcomes 
Progress on the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, Nov. 10, 2017, 
https://www.canada.ca/en/global-
affairs/news/2017/11/minister_champagnewelcomesprogressonthecomprehensiveandprogressi.html (“The members 
of the CPTPP represent 494 million people, with . . . 13.6% of global GDP”); APEC Outcomes & Outlook (2016-
2017) [APEC 2016-17], at 48-51 (explaining the milestones of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) since 
1989). 
10 Although the term, new regional economic order (NREO), was previously used by commentators, none of them 
have substantiated the theoretical or substantive claims related to mega-regionals and Asian regionalism.  E.g., Adriano 
R. Garcia, Toward a New Regional Economic Order in Asian and the Pacific, X:1-b J. PHIL. DEV. 45, 45-53 (1983); 
Greg Fry, “Pooled Regional Governance” in the Island Pacific: Lessons from History, in PACIFIC ISLANDS REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION AND GOVERNANCE 89, 92 (Satish Chand ed. 2005); KUNIKO ASHIZAWA, JAPAN, THE US, AND REGIONAL 
INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN THE NEW ASIA: WHEN IDENTITY MATTERS 66 (2013).  I will make a further distinction 
between the NREO and the new international economic order (NIEO) in the 1970s in subsequent sections. 
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Blueprint 2025 and Asia-Pacific trade pacts, will necessitate the realization of the Free Trade Area 
of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and reenergize the Doha round talks.11 
The article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides the geopolitical context of Asian regionalism 
by deciphering the progress and impediments of mega-regionals and South-based agreements in 
Third Regionalism.12  To buttress the NREO argument, the analysis offers insight into the RCEP’s 
development, negotiating structure and constitutional issues that commentators overlook.  By 
deciphering the legal strategies of ASEAN, China and India, it explains the Global South’s 
contemporary practice of international economic law.  Part III substantiates the RCEP’s paradigm 
shifts in Asian regionalism.  Based on the implementation of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the AEC, it 
challenges the loopholes of tariff eliminations and the rules of origin (ROOs) that result in the 
“noodle bowl syndrome.”13  Given the recent progress of the TPP and EU FTAs with Singapore 
and Vietnam, it also examines the implications of professional mobility and investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) provisions. 
Part IV details the RCEP’s systemic impact on regional and multilateral trading systems.  In 
particular, it sheds light on the transformation of normative conflicts amid trade fragmentation.  
The overlapping jurisdiction between intra-RCEP FTAs and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
requires in-depth scrutiny of WTO jurisprudence and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).  Moreover, the RCEP as the pathway to the APEC-based FTAAP and the pro-
development operative mechanism will be critically analyzed.  Finally, the conclusion draws 
                                                          
11 APEC Outcomes & Outlook, supra note 9, at 5 & 48. 
12 Built on Jagdish Bhagwati’s explanation of the first two waves of regionalism beginning in the 1960s and 1980s, I 
coined the term, Third Regionalism, which refers to the new trends of FTAs in the Doha Round.  Jagdish Bhagwati, 
Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15 WORD ECO. 535, 538-42 (1992). 
13 See generally Richard E. Baldwin, Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism, ADB 
Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, No. 7 (2007). 
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together theoretical and substantive arguments and offers legal and policy advice for Asia-Pacific 
governments and practitioners. 
II. The RCEP in the New Regional Economic Order 
The RCEP’s impact on Asian regionalism has been arguably intertwined with the China-US 
rivalry or the North-South divide.  Yet, the existing research that discusses the TPP as the “gold 
standard” FTA for the 21st century has dismissed the RCEP, either explicitly or implicitly, as a 
low-ambition, unpromising South-driven pact.14  This position cannot hold true.  The populist 
backlash in America prompted other TPP members to conclude the CPTPP on a smaller scale in 
March 2018 and substantiated the significance of Global South powers in world trade law.15  It is 
thus vital to understand the RCEP’s evolution vis-à-vis the legal and policy priorities of stake-
holding countries in the emerging NREO. 
A. Asian Regionalism in Theoretical and Geopolitical Contexts 
The RCEP should not be interpreted in clinical isolation from the geopolitical volatility of 
Asian regionalism and the Asian approach to international economic law.  As a mega-regional 
alliance, the RCEP is representative of the NREO in Third Regionalism.  The new trend is distinct 
from the movement that culminated in the 1974 United Nations General Assembly declaration, 
which called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 16   In rationalizing global 
                                                          
14 E.g., Michael Wesley, Trade Agreements and Strategic Rivalry in Asia, 69:5 AUS. J. INT’L AFF. 479, 489-90 (2015); 
Deborah Kay Elms, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Looking Ahead to the Next Steps, ADBI Working Paper 
Series, No. 447 (2013), at 8-9; Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths toward 
Deeper Asian Economic Integration, 8:2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 359, 368-69 (2013). 
15 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministerial Statement, Mar. 8, 2018; Iman 
Pambagyo, RCEP is the Only Game in Town, 14 ASEAN FOCUS 26, 26-27 (2017).  The original TPP’s ratification 
problems and the stalled negotiations of US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) made the 
RCEP a “promising” mega-regional agreement.  
16 Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), A/RES/S-6/3201, May 
1, 1974. 
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regionalism, Jagdish Bhagwati propounded the term “First Regionalism” in reference to the failure 
of FTAs in the 1960s owing to overriding political interferences.17  He further asserted that in 
“Second Regionalism,” robust economic motivations prompted the success of the European single 
market and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1980s and 90s.18 
Following the demise of the NIEO, I propose the NREO as the normative framework to 
understand the contemporary dynamics of FTAs.  Built on Bhagwati’s account, what I call “Third 
Regionalism” has surfaced in the Doha Round and fertilized the NREO since the 2000s.  This new 
wave highlights a different nature of Asian regionalism that bolsters the assertive legalism of the 
Global South.  The “new dependency theory” that rectifies the classical dependency theory 
provides the theoretical basis for the NREO in Third Regionalism in which the RCEP has been 
developed.  The dependency school that influenced the NIEO presupposes the underdevelopment 
of developing countries as the result of the North-South neocolonial relationship.19  As theorists 
contended, entrenched external unfairness has subordinated the development of developing 
countries to the self-interests of the developed nations.20  By accelerating the North-bound trade 
surplus from the South, international economic relations have only worsened the dependency and 
imparity.21 
                                                          
17 Bhagwati, supra note 12, at 538-39.   
18 Id. at 540-42; for different phases of Asian regionalism, see Amita Acharya, Foundations of Collective Action in 
Asia: Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 344 (2012), at 5-16; Baldwin, 
supra note 13, at 7-17. 
19  Theotonio Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence, 60:2 AM. ECO. REV. 231, 232-34 (1970); FERNANDO 
HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 16-17 (Marjory 
Mattingly Urquidi trans.1979); GAVIN FRIDELL, FAIR TRADE COFFEE: THE PROSPECTS AND PITFALLS OF MARKET-
DRIVEN SOCIAL JUSTICE 31 (2007). 
20  ALVIN Y. SO, SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT: MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND WORLD-SYSTEM 
THEORIES 95-102 (1990). 
21 Id. 
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The classical dependency theory posits that the solution for the Global South is to cut trade ties 
with the North.22  Nonetheless, the isolationist stance contravened the economic trajectory of 
developing countries, particularly those that propelled contemporary Asian regionalism.  
Addressing the theoretical weakness, the new dependency theory argued for the possible 
coexistence of dependency and development.23  The nature of dependency is dynamic because 
developing nations could transform dependent capitalism into the export-driven economies.24  
Rather than becoming preoccupied with the unequal external relationships, the new theory 
emphasizes the impact of the South’s internal structures on changing neocolonial ties with the 
North.25 
As the experiences of East Asian and ASEAN states reinforce, dependency is dynamic by 
nature because the South could escape from dependent capitalism and pursue export-driven growth.  
New-generation South-South FTAs that streamline the supply chain further augment the cost-
effectiveness and the collective power of developing nations to change the structure with the North 
that was once perceived as unfair.  Consequently, the corollaries of the new dependency theory 
underline the theoretical responses to the South-initiated NREO. 
Asian regionalism, which gave rise to the RCEP in the emerging NREO, can trace its roots 
back to the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia, where anticolonial nationalism of Asian-
African states escalated to the Non-Aligned Movement.26  Peripheral to political solidarity, the 
                                                          
22 Id. at 104-05. 
23 See generally SO, supra note 20, at 164-65; FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO, REINVENTING DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL 
(1999); THOMAS BARON GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE (1986). 
24 Based on Taiwan’s development model, Gold explained how the country transformed its dependent relations with 
Japan and the United States to become a neoliberal export-oriented country.  GOLD, supra note 23, at 21-90; SO, supra 
note 20, at 157-64. 
25  Katharina Serrano, The Trade-Development Nexus in EU-Pacific Relations: Realism, Dependence or 
Interdependence, 23:1 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 89, 104 (2011); SO, supra note 20, at 137-42. 
26 Acharya, supra note 18, at 5-7. 
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economic perception of South-South cooperation was to parochially enforce the nationalistic 
concept of self-help by minimizing reliance on the West.27  In the 1970s, Non-Aligned Movement 
states joined the Group of 77 in pushing for NIEO principles that demanded absolute sovereignty 
and affirmative action in international economic law.28  Their efforts through the UN Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) shaped the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which the United States and Europe had dominated. 
The UNCTAD pushed for including core special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions 
under the GATT, such as the non-reciprocity exception to the most-favored-nation (MFN) 
principle and the 1979 Enabling Clause that provides preferential market access for the South.29  
However, the NIEO movement quickly faded because of the Thatcher-Reagan coalition’s refusal 
to additional demands and non-uniform interests within the Global South. 30   The rising 
Washington Consensus became the dominant driving force for creating the WTO and compelled 
developing nations to engage in North-defined “free trade.”31  Since its inception, the WTO has 
been criticized for ignoring the development needs of the South. 
                                                          
27 Id. 
28 The Early Days of the Group of 77, May 2014, https://unchronicle.un.org/article/early-days-group-77; History and 
Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement, Aug. 22, 2-12, http://mea.gov.in/in-focus-
article.htm?20349/History+and+Evolution+of+NonAligned+Movement. 
29 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1994), art. XXXVI:8; Differential and More Favorable Treatment 
of Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903, Nov. 28, 1979.  The contracting 
parties of the GATT adopted the permanent Enabling Clause after the 1971 decision that granted a ten-year waiver 
allowing generalized system of preferences to depart from GATT norms.  Generalized System of Preferences, Decision 
of 25 June 1971, L/3545, June 28, 1971. 
30 JAMES M. CYPHER, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 238 (4th ed. 2014); Trade and Development Report 
(2014), at 67-68. 
31 John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: 
TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 14, 16-17 (Narcís Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds. 2008); SONIA E. ROLLAND, 
DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 51 (2012); Chantal Thomas & Joel P Trachtman, Editors’ 
Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 1, 9 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P Trachtman eds. 
2009).  
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The NREO is a reaction to the South’s frustrations over the existing global economic order.  
Two paramount factors in Third Regionalism galvanized the convergence of polices of Global 
South powers in creating the RCEP.  First, the deviation from the US-centric “unipolar moment” 
to multipolar trade governance became a reality in the Doha Round.32  Asia’s ascending economies 
have weakened Washington’s hegemonic power and materialized multipolar reality.  In 2016. the 
Obama government’s “pivot to Asia” strategy culminated in the inking of the TPP, which was seen 
as an initiative to tackle rising China.33  However, soaring populist isolationism in the United 
States has undermined the TPP’s strategic goals and the cross-Atlantic alliance on which the NIEO 
once relied.  The stalled Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations and 
the EU agreements with ASEAN states have also aggravated the Western powers’ divergent 
paths.34 
Second, South-South FTAs concluded between developing countries have departed from the 
NIEO’s ideological bedrock of the North-South conflicts.  As the new dependency theory suggests, 
developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs), such as Vietnam and Myanmar, 
diametrically shifted their policies from import substitution to export-driven orientation.  Moreover, 
the West’s economic slowdown and Asia’s increasing intraregional trade led to South-South FTAs 
representing two-thirds of FTAs and substantially outpacing the North-South FTAs.35  Different 
                                                          
32 For the unipolar and multi-polar discussions, see generally Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 
FOREIGN AFF. 23 (1990-91); William W. Burke-White, Power Shifts in International Law: Structure Realignment and 
Substantive Pluralism, 56:1 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2015).   
33 Hillary Clinton, America’s Pacific Century, 189 FOREIGN POLICY 56, 60-62 (2011); David Nakamura, Obama Turns 
on Personal Appeal while Trying to Bolster His Pivot to Asia, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-tries-to-land-his-pivot-to-asia/2015/11/20/e2222e62-8e8b-11e5-
ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html; Ian F. Fergusson & Brock R. Williams, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key 
Provisions and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (2016), at 1-6. 
34  Szu Ping Chan, New Trade War Threatens Global Order as TTIP Talks Stall, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 3, 2016, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/09/03/new-trade-war-threatens-global-order-as-ttip-talks-stall/.  The EU 
concluded FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam and resume negotiations for the EU-ASEAN FTA.  European 
Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (2015), at 30-32. 
35 World Trade Report 2011 – The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence (2011) 
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from their predecessors, more than 70% of today’s Asian trade pacts encompass WTO-plus 
commitments.36  This development illustrates how the assertive legalism of developing nations 
makes the South the center of the hub-and-spoke system. 
B. The Global South’s Practice of International Economic Law 
The theoretical and geopolitical explanations shed light on the Global South’s search for new 
norms to guide their international economic law development.  In Second Regionalism, APEC’s 
formation escalated aspirations for Asian integration.  Nevertheless, the institutional weakness of 
APEC’s soft-law approach has crippled the intended result of the Bogor Goals to achieve “free 
and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific” by 2020. 37   Renewed momentum for 
regionalism surged after the Asian financial crisis in 1997.  Widespread frustrations over US-
dominated global financial institutions invigorated the ASEAN+3 framework for currency 
stability.38 
At the inception of Third Regionalism, China and Japan vigorously vied for the regional 
leadership.  The East Asian Vision Group, set up under the ASEAN+3 structure, proposed the East 
Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) in 2001.39  While Beijing backed the EAFTA initiative, Tokyo 
countered it with the alternative ASEAN+6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia 
                                                          
[World Trade Report 2011], at 52-53.  In 2015, Asia’s intraregional trade was 57.1%, higher than intra-regional trade 
in North America (64%) and lower than the European Union (EU) (63%).  Asian Economic Integration Report (2016), 
at 18. 
36 See e.g., Richard Baldwin & Masahiro Kawai, Multilateralizing Asian Regionalism, ADBI Working Paper Series, 
No. 431 (2013), at 8-9 (finding that 77% of surveyed FTAs in Asia partially or completely include Singapore issues). 
37 See 1994 Leaders’ Declaration, Nov. 15, 1994 (stating that industrialized economies and developing economies 
should achieve the goals by 2010 and 2020, respectively). 
38 The “ASEAN+3” framework includes ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan and Korea.  Shujiro Urata, Constructing 
and Multilateralizing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: An Asian Perspective, No. 449 (2013), at 
7.  The result was the creation of the currency swap arrangement called the Chiang Mai Initiative, the predecessor to 
the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation Agreement. 
39 Summary of Stock-Taking Report on the ASEAN Plus Three Economic and Financial Cooperation, in Report of the 
East Asian Vision Group II (EAVG) 43, 43-46 (2013); Christopher M. Kent, East Asian Integration Towards An East 
Asian Economic Community, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 665 (2017), at 23.  
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(CEPEA) in 2006.40  In Japan’s view, the CEPEA could deepen the foundation of the Fukuda 
Doctrine by enhancing ASEAN-Japan ties, and the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand 
would counterbalance Chinese influence.41   
During the same period, the FTAAP proposal and US accession to the TPP further complicated 
the roadmap for Asian regionalism.42  To avoid being marginalized and fortify the bloc’s centrality, 
ASEAN states introduced the framework for the “ASEAN-led process” to integrate FTA partners 
in 2011.43  Based on ASEAN’s 2012 Guiding Principles for the RCEP, the 16-party negotiations 
essentially merged EAFTA and CEPEA proposals and expect to create the world’s most significant 
mega-regional deal by 2018.44  In my view, the converging polices of ASEAN, China and India 
reinforce the status of the RCEP in global regionalism and their contemporary FTA practice.  More 
fundamentally, these new polices help resist rising trade protectionism in the West and represent 
the assertive legalism of Global South powers in pursuing the NREO. 
1. ASEAN 
                                                          
40 In addition, Japan favored the ASEAN+6-based Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) 
because it was based on Japan’s proposal and it was the work of the Japanese government-funded think tank, the 
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).  Rodolfo C. Severino, Japan’s Relations with ASEAN, 
in ASEAN-JAPAN RELATIONS 17, 27-28 (Takashi Shiraishi & Takaaki Kojima eds. 2014). 
41 See SUEO SUDO, JAPAN’S ASEAN POLICY: IN SEARCH OF PROACTIVE MULTILATERALISM 69-75 (2015) (explaining 
the origin and principles of the Fukuda Doctrine); see also Seungjoo Lee, Institutional Balancing and the Politics of 
Mega-FTAs in East Asia, 56:6 ASIAN SURVEY 1055, 1069 (2016) (“Japan has attempted to take advantage of US 
influence to hold China in check.”). 
42 See generally Pasha L. Hsieh, Reassessing APEC’s Role as a Trans-Regional Economic Architecture: Legal and 
Policy Dimensions, 16:1 J. INT’L ECO. L. 119, 142-43 (2013); Fergusson & Williams, supra note 33, at 1-2. 
43 ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2011). 
44 Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2012) 
[Guiding Principles].  The first round of negotiations took place in Brunei in 2013 and the 18 th round of negotiations 
was held in Vietnam in 2017.  Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: News, 
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/news/Pages/news.aspx (July 5, 2017).  The deadline for the RCEP’s 
conclusion has shifted from 2015 to 2018.  Joint Declaration on the Launch of Negotiations for the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (2012); Amiti Sen, RCEP Talks: India under Pressure to Offer Deeper Tariff 
Cuts, HINDU, May 3, 2017, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/rcep-talks-india-under-pressure-
to-offer-deeper-tariff-cuts/article9679098.ece. 
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Contrary to the common misconception that China has dominated RCEP negotiations, in 
reality the FTA has been driven by ASEAN.45  While China and Japan could not agree on the 
EAFTA and the CEPEA proposals, the two largest Asian economies compromised by enabling 
ASEAN to drive the RCEP process.  From legal and political perspectives, relying on the existing 
frameworks of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the AEC constitutes the most feasible option for the 
unprecedented mega-regional pact.  The ASEAN-initiated RCEP would also serve as a normative 
basis for pro-development FTAs. 
ASEAN’s internal and external integration provides the foundation for the RCEP that covers 
ASEAN’s ten member states and six FTA partners.  While the existing literature predominantly 
links the RCEP to ASEAN+1 FTAs, it is incorrect to ignore the implementation of the AEC.46  
The 1967 Bangkok Declaration gave birth to ASEAN by forming a loose security alliance that 
sought to contain widespread communism. 47   Resting upon the Indonesian concepts of 
musyawarah and mufakat, the postcolonial mind-set led to the “ASEAN way,” which established 
the bloc’s non-intervention principle based on consultation and consensus.48   
The constitutional moment was the enactment of the ASEAN Charter to codify the established 
practice and confer legal personality on ASEAN “as an inter-governmental” organization. 49  
Distinguishable from the super-national EU, ASEAN has operated under the soft-law horizontal 
integration model rather than a top-down, hard-law approach.  A result of this difference is the 
                                                          
45 Maria, supra note 5; see also Pambargyo, supra note 15, at 27 (“[T]here has been no sign or sense that China has 
become more pro-active in RCEP negotiations other than a significant increase in the number of participants in the 
Chinse delegation.”). 
46 An analysis of ASAEN+1 FTAs is the conventional approach to understanding the RCEP.  E.g., Das et. al., supra 
note 6, at 262-54; Fukunaga & Isono, supra note 6, at 8-18; Urata, supra note 38, at 12-17. 
47 RODOLFO C. SEVERINO, SOUTHEAST ASIA IN SEARCH OF AN ASEAN COMMUNITY: INSIGHTS FROM THE FORMER 
ASEAN SECRETARY-GENERAL 1-11 (2006).   
48 Id.; INGO VENZKE AND LI-ANN THIO, THE INTERNAL EFFECTS OF ASEAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS 9-17 (2016). 
49 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2007) [ASEAN Charter], art. 3. 
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lack of ASEAN law’s “direct effect” to override domestic law.  Although the Charter requires 
members to “take all necessary measures” to implement ASEAN treaties, national constitutions 
are unlikely to be interpreted as granting such treaties self-executing power.50 
As an integral part of the RCEP, the AEC represents a breakthrough in the NREO.  In 2015, 
the creation of the AEC culminated ASEAN’s internal integration that began with the 1993 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).51  The AEC architecture comprises new-generation South-
based pacts.  To remedy the AFTA’s low-utilization, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement 
(ATIGA) consolidated previous agreements on goods and reduced non-tariff barriers.52  As of 
2017, the negotiations under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) have led to 
the ratification of nine packages of services commitments. 53   The ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement (ACIA) streamlined the schedule of reservations and enhanced the 
investor-state arbitration mechanism.54  These commitments and the target of the AEC Blueprint 
2025 to build “a highly integrated and cohesive economy” collectively form the benchmark for 
RCEP negotiations.55 
                                                          
50  ASEAN Charter, art. 5:2; see also Diane A. Desierto, ASEAN’s Constitutionalization of International Law: 
Challenges to Evolution under the New ASEAN Charter, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 268, 300-03 (2010-11) 
(interpreting pertinent constitutional provisions of ASEAN states). 
51 SEVERINO, supra note 47, at 222-25; Masahiro Kawai & Kanda Naknoi, ASEAN Economic Integration through 
Trade and Foreign Direct Investment: Long-Term Challenges, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 545 (2015), at 12-13.  
Note that in 2007, ASEAN approved the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2015 with the intention to 
form “a single market and production base” in 2015.  ASAEN Economic Community Blueprint (2015) [AEC Blueprint 
2015], at 5-6.  The AEC Blueprint 2025, which will govern ASEAN’s development from 2016 to 2025, replaced the 
AEC Blueprint 2015 when the AEC was established.  ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (2025) [AEC 
Blueprint 2025], at 1-2. 
52 Kanya Satyani Sasradipoera, ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), in ASEAN: LIFE AFTER THE CHARTER 
89, 90-92 (S. Tiwari ed. 2010); STEFANO INAMA & EDMUND W. SIM, RULES OF ORIGIN IN ASEAN: A WAY FORWARD 
4-27 (2015). 
53 Also note that the conclusion of the final, 10th package of commitments was postponed from 2015 to 2017.  Deunden 
Nikomborirak & Supunnavadee Jitdumrong, An Assessment of Services Sector Liberalization in ASEAN, in ASEAN 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY SCORECARD: PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTION 47, 53 (Sanchita Basu Das ed. 2013); 
Chairman’s Statement on the 28th and 29th ASEAN Summits, Sept. 6-7, 2016, at 10.   
54 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement: A Guidebook for Business & Investors (2013), at 9-11. 
55 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 3.  Presumably due to the challenge meeting all targets in the AEC Blueprint 
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A key point should be highlighted.  The new Blueprint’s “global ASEAN” initiative places the 
RCEP as ASEAN’s priority.56  From 2002 to 2017, ASEAN concluded six ASEAN+1 FTAs with 
seven Asia-Pacific partners, including Australia, China and India. 57   Akin to the AEC, the 
ASEAN+1 FTAs have strengthened the notion of ASEAN centrality, which is mandated by the 
ASEAN Charter to secure the bloc’s economic and geopolitical relevance. 58   This concept 
empowers ASEAN to be an indispensable middle power in Asian regionalism.59  Although policy 
debates on the RCEP have revolved around ASEAN+1 FTAs, their differences in legal structures 
and commitments could endanger the RCEP.  The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA 
(AANZFTA) is the most comprehensive single-undertaking FTA.60  Other ASEAN+1 FTAs have 
followed the incremental approach by enacting a framework agreement that facilitates the 
conclusion of sectoral agreements on trade in goods, services, investment and dispute settlement.  
The “incomplete” exception is the ASEAN-Japan FTA that merely finalized the agreement on 
goods because of Tokyo’s reliance on higher commitments in seven bilateral FTAs with ASEAN 
states.61   
                                                          
2015, the new Blueprint dropped the term “single market.” 
56 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 35-36. 
57  For the treaty texts, see Free Trade Agreements with Dialogue Partners, http://asean.org/asean-economic-
community/free-trade-agreements-with-dialogue-partners/ (July 7, 2017); Joint Media Statement, The Signing of the 
ASEAN-Hong Kong, China Free Trade Agreement and the ASEAN, China Investment Agreement (2017) [ASEAN-
Hong Kong Statement], at 1. 
58 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 2.  The development of the ASEAN centrality since the 1990s, see WALTER 
WOON, THE ASEAN CHARTER: A COMMENTARY 56-58 (2016); Yoshifumi Fukunaga, ASEAN’s Leadership in the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 2:1 ASIA & THE PAC. POL’Y STUDIES 103, 106 (2014). 
59 The ASEAN exercises power as a collective bloc and is thus distinct from traditional middle powers such as 
Australia and New Zealand.  For the definitions of middle powers, see Eduard Jordaan, The Concept of a Middle 
Power in International Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers, 30:1 Politikon: 
South African Journal of Political Studies 165, 165-75 (2003); Andrew Carr, Is Australia a Middle Power? A Systemic 
Impact Approach, 68:1 AUS. J. INT’L AFF. 70, 70-81 (2014). 
60 See generally Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (2009). 
61 The framework agreement and the agreement on goods was concluded in 2003 and 2008, respectively.  ASEAN – 
Japan Free Trade Area, http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-japan-free-trade-area-2. Japan has concluded FTAs with 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.  Trade Policy Review: Report by the 
Secretariat: Japan, WT/TPR/S/351, Jan. 18, 2017, at 24; Severino, supra note 40, at 26-27; David Chin Soon Siong, 
ASEAN’s Journey towards Free Trade, in ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: ESSAYS AND REFLECTIONS BY SINGAPORE’S 
Pasha L. Hsieh, 51:3 Cornell Int’l L. J. (forthcoming 2018) 
16 
 
 
Significantly, notwithstanding the treaty-making power provision under the ASEAN Charter, 
the conferral of the EU concept of competence by member states on ASEAN to conclude treaties 
does not extend to those that will “create obligations upon individual” states.62  Thus, the Charter 
did not alter the negotiating practice of ASEAN+1 FTAs or the RCEP.  Seeking the converged 
position at the “ASEAN Caucus” meeting prior to RCEP negotiations is perceived as a political 
exercise rather than a legal obligation.63  Therefore, political consensus among ten ASEAN states 
is essential to ensure the status of the AEC in the NREO and to fortify the concept of the ASEAN 
centrality in the RCEP. 
2. China 
As part of the Global South, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as a global 
economic power since its open-door policy commenced in 1978.  Based on the evolution of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Beijing Consensus allegedly provides developing 
nations with an alternative model to the Washington Consensus. 64   China’s trade strategy 
illustrates its changing international law practice.  Its accession to the UN and the WTO was 
motivated by a desire to assert the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.  In Third 
Regionalism, China has transformed from a passive participant to an assertive stakeholder on 
global rule-making.  The PRC’s new great power status under the principle of “peaceful 
development,” which replaced “peaceful rise” that suggested Sino-centric hegemony, has 
                                                          
NEGOTIATIONS 209, 229-30 (C. L. Lim & Margaret Liang eds. 2011). 
62 ASEAN Charter, art. 41:7; Rules of Procedure for Conclusion of International Agreements by ASEAN (2011), rule 
1. 
63 E.g., Indicative ASEAN Notional Calendar (2017), at 7.  Technically speaking, the Charter only requires states to 
“coordinate and endeavor to develop common positions.”  ASEAN Charter (2007), art. 41:4. 
64  For a detailed analysis of the Beijing Consensus, see THE BEIJING CONSENSUS? HOW CHINA HAS CHANGED 
WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Weitseng Chen ed. 2017). 
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galvanized the Xi Jinping administration to fill the political vacuum in the wake of US 
isolationism.65 
Against this backdrop, three prime considerations underpin China’s legal and political 
approach to the RCEP and other FTAs.  First, as the largest RCEP economy, which accounts for 
one third of RCEP GDP, this FTA augments China’s right of discourse in international law.66  
China has been a beneficiary of the capitalist, neoliberal trading system.  The post-Mao regime 
has never challenged the normality of the “Western” rules that sustain the system.  Instead, China 
has maximized its influence over global rule-making.  Being a core RCEP member allows China 
to construct the legal pathway to the FTAAP.  The Obama-backed TPP once posed threats to 
Beijing’s strategy.  China’s TPP standpoint is exemplified by its acceleration of bilateral FTAs 
and the RCEP, as well as its experiment with higher-level liberalization in the Shanghai Pilot Free 
Trade Zone. 67   Ironically, the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the TPP pushed 
Washington’s Asian allies to embrace the RCEP and enabled Beijing to carry the torch for free 
trade and globalization.   
Second, an interrelated legal controversy is Section 15 of China’s Protocol of Accession to the 
WTO, which stipulates that the provisions allowing WTO members to treat China as a non-market 
                                                          
65 See Congyan Cai, New Great Powers and International Law in the 21st Century, 24:3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 755, 786-77 
(2013) (explaining the transition from peaceful rise to peaceful development); Full text from President Xi Jinping’s 
speech (2015), https://www.ncuscr.org/content/full-text-president-xi-jinpings-speech (“To demonstrate our 
commitment to peaceful development, I announced not long ago that the size of China’s military will be cut by 
300,000.”). 
66 China’s share of RCEP GDP, see Paul Hubbard & Dhruv Sharma, Understanding and Applying Long-term GDP 
Projections, EABER Working Paper Series, No. 18 (2016), at 15; Jianmin Jin, RCEP v. TPP, Feb. 22, 2013, 
http://www.fujitsu.com/jp/group/fri/en/column/message/2013/2013-02-22.html. 
67 Ming Du, Explaining China’s Tripartite Strategy Toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 18 J. INT’L ECO. 
L. 407, 414-30 (2015); see also Rajah & Tann Regional Round-up, Issue 2 (2017), 
http://eoasis.rajahtann.com/eoasis/gn/rn2.asp?n=17&c=2#A1 (“China officially released its updated negative list for 
admission of foreign investment in the free trade zones . . . . Compared to the 2015 version, the new negative list has 
cut 10 items and 27 restrictions across eight industries.”). 
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economy “shall expire 15 years after the date of accession.”68  The non-market economy status 
legalized foreign countries’ use of “surrogate” prices in anti-dumping proceedings, thus making it 
easier to find Chinese exporters liable for dumping.69  Rather than attacking the normative value 
of Section 15 that it deems unfair,  China has resorted to FTAs to circumvent the provision.  The 
ASEAN-China FTA illustrates such efforts, as it accords China “full market economy” status to 
the exclusion of WTO rules.70   
Despite the statutory expiration of Section 15 in December 2016, the United States, the EU 
and Japan declined to alter the non-market economy methodology owing to political sensitivity 
involving the inflow of Chinese goods.71  In response, Beijing filed concurrent WTO complaints 
against Washington and Brussels.72  The RCEP could compel Japan to accept the ASEAN-China 
FTA practice of recognizing China as a market economy and thus marginalize US and EU 
positions in the interpretation of world trade law.  
Lastly, the RCEP will advance China’s economic interests in the NREO.  Empirical data 
demonstrate that the Chinese economy alone could gain $88 billion if the TPP failed and the RCEP 
were passed, and this amount is $16 billion more than the scenario where both mega-regionals 
came into effect.73  The RCEP is a key instrument to implement China’s 13th Five-Year Plan, in 
                                                          
68 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, Nov. 23, 2001, sec. 15(d). 
69 Spokesman of the Ministry of Commerce Comments on China’s Indicting the US and European Union for their 
Practices of Anti-dumping “Surrogate Country” in the WTO, Dec. 13, 2016, 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201612/20161202192355.shtml. 
70 Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (2004) [ASEAN-China Framework 
Agreement], art. 14. 
71 Shawn Donnan et. al., China Challenges EU and US over Market Economy Status, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 12, 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/6af8da62-bf5d-11e6-9bca-2b93a6856354?mhq5j=e1. 
72 DS515: United States –  Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (2016); DS516: European Union – 
Measures Related to Price Comparison Methodologies (2016). 
73 2016 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2016), at 24; Ronglin Li 
and Yang Hu, RCEP, TPP and China’s FTA Strategies, at 9, 
http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload_files/Report_3_54_RCEP,_6192294083.pdf (last visited July 19, 2017). 
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which the National People’s Congress first placed the “One Belt, One Road” initiative as a national 
priority in 2016. 74   This initiative fortifies China’s long-standing approach to South-South 
cooperation that emphasizes concessional loans for infrastructure building to facilitate the export 
of Chinese production, capital and labor. 
Contrary to the assertion of Beijing and pro-government academics, I argue that OBOR is 
primarily based on ambitious yet ambiguous policy statements that are far from legal 
commitments.75  What was patently ignored in discourse is the financial risks that could arise from 
investment in many of the 68 OBOR members such as Iraq and Palestine.76   OBOR’s few 
substantive results include the creation of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), which fills Asian states’ infrastructure needs that global financial institutions fail to meet.  
As more than 60 members joined the AIIB, including all RCEP countries except Japan, the bank 
will facilitate ASEAN+6 economic cooperation through its development projects.77 
                                                          
74 The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is based on Chinese President Xi’s announcement of “the Silk Road 
Economic Belt” and “the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road” in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, respectively, in 2013.  
Chronology of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Xinhuanet, Mar. 28, 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-
03/28/c_134105435.htm.  See Katherine Koleski, The 13th Five-Year Plan, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission (2017), at 1 & 22 (indicating the goal of the initiative is to “export China’s enormous excess 
industrial capacity and strengthen debt-laden SOEs’ international competitiveness”). 
75 E.g., Action plan on the Belt and Road Initiative (2015).  China and Hong Kong-based academics have attempted 
to link OBOR to business, investment and tax laws.  Legal Dimensions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Lutz-
Christian Wolff & Chao Xi eds. 2016). 
76 Juvina Lai, UN Warns about Financial Risk over China’s One Belt One Road Project, TAIWAN NEWS, May 26, 2017, 
http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3173396; Chong Koh Ping, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road 
Forum Yields deals with 68 Countries and International Groups, STRAIT TIMES, May 15, 2017, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-president-xi-jinpings-belt-and-road-forum-yields-deals-with-68-
countries-and; The Belt and Road Initiative: Country Profiles, http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-
news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-Country-
Profiles/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A36I0.htm (last visited July 19, 2017). 
77 Lee Hyuntai et. al., Evaluation of Recent Development of the AIIB: The 2nd Annual Meeting of the AIIB Held in 
Korea and its Implications, WORLD ECON. BRIEF, Vol. 7:15 (2007), at 1; Members and Prospective Members of the 
Bank, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/ (last visited July 19, 2017).  See also Min Ye, 
China and Competing Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, RCEP, and the New Silk Road, 11:3 ASIAN SECURITY 206, 
212 (2015) (“China has promoted AIIB . . . to fund infrastructure projects in countries along the new Silk Road.”). 
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OBOR also ascended to the PRC State Council’s new FTA strategy, which goes beyond trade 
commitments and extends to e-commerce and environmental protection.78  Four of China’s FTAs 
encompass 13 RCEP members.79  The ASEAN-China FTA is indicative.  As Asia’s largest South-
South FTA that is currently in force, the ASEAN-China FTA was created under a framework 
agreement and four subsequent agreements signed between 2002 and 2009.80  Despite criticism of 
its low liberalization level, the ASEAN-China FTA’s “living agreement” design led to the 2011 
second package of services commitments and the 2015 protocol to upgrade goods and investment 
commitments.81  Moreover, instead of joining the ASEAN-China FTA, Hong Kong concluded a 
free-standing FTA with ASEAN in November 2017. 82   The ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA, the 
amended ASEAN-China FTA, and China’s recent FTAs with Australia and Korea will shape the 
RCEP in line with OBOR. 
3. India 
India was the key stakeholder of the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement 
that championed South-South cooperation.83  In the 1990s, the bipartisan consensus formulated 
the Look East Policy in order to forge the neglected economic link to East Asia and counteract the 
rise of China. 84   This post-Cold War strategy substantiated the ASEAN-India Framework 
                                                          
78 The Certain Opinions on Accelerating the Implementation of the Free Trade Area Strategy (2015). 
79 The four FTAs are China’s FTAs with ASEAN, Australia, Korea and Singapore.  China’s Free Trade Agreement, 
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/ (last visited July 19, 2017). 
80  ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreements, http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-china-free-trade-area-2 (last visited 
July 19, 2017). 
81 Id.; Agreement on Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation 
between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (2007), art. 23; Razeen Sally, 
AESAN FTAs: State of Play and Outlook for ASEAN’s Regional and Global Integration, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 320, 352-53 (Sanchita Basu Das et. al. eds. 2013). 
82 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 35; ASEAN Economic Community 2025 Consolidated Strategic Action Plan 
(2017) [AEC 2025 CSAP], at 47; ASEAN-Hong Kong Statement, supra note 57, at 1. 
83 Acharya, supra note 18, at 5-7; History and Evolution of Non-Aligned Movement, supra note 28. 
84 Malla V.S.V. Prasad, Political and Security Cooperation between India and ASEAN: Implications for Economic 
Cooperation, in INDIA-ASEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 267, 269-84 
(Nagesh Kumar et. al. 2006) 267, 269-84; SEVERINO, supra note 47, at 290-93.   
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Agreement and bilateral FTAs with three ASEAN countries, Japan and Korea.85  Despite these 
legal efforts, India is yet to be at the core of Asian regionalism.  New Delhi is not an APEC member 
and it stands outside the vertically-integrated supply chain of the East Asian market.86  Economic 
data evidence India’s de facto isolation from ASEAN.  China and Korea constitute 15.2% and 5.4% 
of ASEAN’s total trade, respectively, but India accounts for merely 2.6%.87  While ASEAN 
primarily trades electrical devices with Asia-Pacific countries, ASEAN-India trade predominantly 
involves raw materials, such as dairy and mineral products.88 
In Third Regionalism, India’s most compelling move is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Act 
East Policy,” which was declared in Myanmar in 2014.89  The new policy adopts a more action-
based approach than its predecessor by reinvigorating defense and economic ties with Asian 
trading partners.  Thus, the RCEP serves as the vehicle for India to be included in Asia-Pacific 
integration and benefits the “Make in India” campaign to make the nation a manufacturing and 
services hub.90  The mega-regional pact will provide Indian businesses with market access to 
Australia and China.  More importantly, akin to Beijing’s motivation, the shaping of the RCEP 
empowers New Delhi to be recognized as a great power in global rule-making. 
For RCEP countries, India’s participation in the pact presents opportunities and risks.  The 
RCEP legal framework that accommodates India and ASEAN’s LDCs, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Vietnam (collectively known as CLMV countries) presents the normative foundation for the 
                                                          
85 V.S. Seshadri, Evolution in India’s Regional Trading Arrangement, 43:5 J. WORLD TRADE 903, 908-09 (2009); 
India’s FTAs, see http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_ta.asp?id=2&trade=i (last visited July 21, 2017). 
86 Das et. al., supra note 6, at 262; Sally, supra note 81, 355. 
87 ASEAN Community in Figures: ACIF (2016), at 15. 
88 Id. at 24-31. 
89  Prashanth Parameswaran, Modi Unveils India’s ‘Act East Policy’ to ASEAN in Myanmar, Nov. 17, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/modi-unveils-indias-act-east-policy-to-asean-in-myanmar/. 
90 See generally id.; Sara Itagaki, Understanding India's Evolving Role in Asia through an ASEAN Prism, Policy Q&A, 
The National Bureau of Asian Research (2016). 
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Global South.  Given China’s economic slowdown, India’s astonishing 7% GDP growth rate and 
infrastructure needs will yield additional trade gains.91  The jeopardy arises from Sino-Indian 
clashes that range from border disputes to leadership competition, which echoes China’s discord 
with Japan as to the pathways to Asian regionalism.  To check Chinese dominance, Singapore and 
Vietnam within ASEAN have actively called for India’s greater role.92  Markedly, India did not 
join the Beijing-led OBOR.93  The Modi-Abe alliance created the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor 
that resembles OBOR by focusing on infrastructure projects and capacity building. 94   Such 
interstate dynamics inevitably influence the RCEP progress. 
India’s conservative stance on trade liberalization has led Beijing to accuse New Delhi of 
“selfishly” obstructing RCEP negotiations and prompted ASEAN states to consider the “ASEAN 
Minus X” formula.95  India’s insistence on the RCEP’s single-undertaking structure departs from 
the ASEAN-India FTA, which is modeled after the ASEAN-China FTA’s incremental building-
block approach.96  The ASEAN-India services and investment agreements were only concluded in 
                                                          
91 Asian Development Outlook 2017: Highlights (2017), at xv. 
92  Kenneth Lim, Singapore a ‘Firm Believer’ in India: PM Lee, Channel News Asia, Oct. 4, 2016, 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-a-firm-believer-in-india-pm-lee-7740730; Kallol 
Bhattacherjee, VIETNAM FOR GREATER INDIAN ROLE IN SE ASIA, HINDU, July 4, 2017, 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/vietnam-asks-india-to-play-security-role-in-south-china-
sea/article19210720.ece. 
93 Avinash Nair, To Counter OBOR, India and Japan Propose Asia-Africa Sea Corridor, INDIAN EXPRESS, May 31, 
2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/to-counter-obor-india-and-japan-propose-asia-africa-sea-corridor-
4681749/. 
94 Id.; Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development: A Vision Statement 
(2017), at 3-6. 
95  India Selfishly Blocking RCEP Pact: Chinese Media, ECON. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2017, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-selfishly-blocking-rcep-pact-chinese-
media/articleshow/56644605.cms.  The ASEAN-X formula, which had been discussed on a limited scale at the RCEP 
meetings, was proposed by the Philippines, the ASEAN Chair in 2017.  Pambagyo, supra note 15, at 27; Catherine 
Pillas, Asean Minus X formula to fast-track RCEP-PHL, BUS. MIRROR, May 8, 2017, 
http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/asean-minus-x-formula-to-fast-track-rcep-phl/. 
96 The single undertaking approach will lead to a single, comprehensive FTA that covers core areas of goods, services 
and investment.  See Amiti Sen, RCEP: India Gets Trade Ministers on Board on ‘Single Undertaking’ for Goods, 
Services, HINDU BUS. LINE, Nov. 7, 2016, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/rcep-india-gets-trade-
ministers-on-board-on-single-undertaking-for-goods-services/article9316063.ece. 
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2014, 11 years after the inking of the framework agreement.97  The prolonged process reflects 
India’s irreconcilable politics of protectionism. 
On the WTO front, India applies MFN tariff rates up to 150% to support its domestic 
agriculture. 98   In the ASEAN-India FTA, Indian agricultural projects are mostly immune to 
liberalization because they are either excluded or scheduled under the sensitive track.99  India has 
been the WTO forerunner for liberalizing labor mobility, known as Mode 4 within the definition 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 100   This position facilitates the 
exportation of Indian professional services in information technology (IT) and other areas.  As the 
ASEAN-India FTA has exacerbated deficits in trade in goods without generating sufficient 
services exports, the Modi government “will not repeat the mistake” in ASEAN-Indian 
negotiations.101  Hence, New Delhi demanded the single-undertaking formula adopted for the 
AANZFTA, so that concessions for tariff cuts will be tied to the potential gains for services market 
access. 
As for controversial intellectual property (IP) provisions, the Indian position conflicts with 
Japan’s and Korea’s proposals that intend to “TPP-nize” the RCEP standards.102  A key example 
                                                          
97 ASEAN-India Free Trade Area, http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-india-free-trade-area-3 (last visited July 21, 
2017). 
98 Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat: India, WT/TPE/S/313, Apr. 28, 2015, at 99-100. 
99 See Sally, supra note 81, 356-66 (analyzing the tariff elimination under the ASEAN-India Framework Agreement 
and the Trade in Goods Agreements). 
100 E.g., Communication from India: Proposed Liberalisation of Movement of Professionals under 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), S/CSS/W/12, Nov. 24, 2000; Communication from Brazil, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, The Philippines and Thailand, Review of Progress in 
Negotiations, Including Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of the Guidelines for Negotiations, TN/S/W/23, Sept. 29, 2004.  
101  Amiti Sen, India Pushes for Easy Visa for Professionals under RCEP, HINDU BUS. LINE, Oct. 22, 2015, 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-pitches-for-market-access-for-professionals-in-
rcep/article7792816.ece; see also Blake Harley Berger, India, ASEAN, and RCEP: The Challenges of Negotiating a 
Services Pact, CHINA-INDIA BRIEF, No. 71, https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publication/china-india-brief/china-india-
brief-71 (last visited July 20, 2017) (“[The ASEAN-Indian] services pact as of 2016 has yet to be ratified by . . . 
Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which is extremely significant as Indonesia is India’s largest trading partner 
within ASEAN.”). 
102 The summary of Japan’s and Korea’s requests for the RCEP intellectual property provisions, see Belinda Townsend 
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is the protection of data exclusivity under the TPP.  Article 18.50 of the TPP, which the CPTPP 
suspended, exceeds the requirement of Article 39 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).103  Pharmaceutical companies normally invest 
dramatically in developing clinical trial data.  For a fixed period of time, the TRIPS-plus protection 
obliges countries to prohibit such data from being utilized by subsequent manufacturers for generic 
drugs.  Data exclusivity would give a monopoly to developed nations’ corporations and 
significantly undermine the granting of compulsory licenses for handling public health crises, 
including India’s tuberculosis epidemic.104  The RCEP’s draft investment chapter that incorporates 
IP rights in the definition of investments eligible for ISDS further fortifies India’s resistance.105  
These issues illustrate India’s legal considerations that may compromise RCEP commitments.   
III. Key Components of RCEP Negotiations 
By making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, this article presents the NREO as 
the new normative framework for understanding Third Regionalism.  Different from the NIEO 
that is preoccupied with the North-South conflicts, the RCEP represents the NREO that facilitates 
South-South FTAs.  The theoretical underpinning of the NREO is thus reinforced by the assertive 
legalism of the Global South in transforming the dependency dilemma into active FTA policies.   
Notably, the Guiding Principles have influenced the RCEP’s legal structure.  First of all, de 
jure integration that replaces intra-RCEP trade pacts is not intended.  Instead, the RCEP will 
                                                          
et. al., The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Intellectual Property Protection, and Access to Medicines, 
28:8 ASIA PAC. J. PUB. HEALTH 682, 684 (2016). 
103 TPP, art. 18.50(1); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1995), art. 39(3); Annex 
II – List of Suspended Provisions, TPP Statement, supra note 9. 
104 MSF Technical Brief, Data Exclusivity in International Trade Agreements: What Consequences for Access to 
Medicines? (2004), at 2; Jyotsna Singh, Proposed Trade Pact Clause on Intellectual Property Could Endanger India’s 
TB Programme, TB ONLINE, Apr. 11, 2017, http://www.tbonline.info/posts/2017/4/11/proposed-trade-pact-clause-
intellectual-property-c/. 
105 Based on the consolidated version dated Oct. 16, 2015.  Townsend et. al., supra note 102, at 690. 
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improve five ASEAN+1 FTAs, and it will not “detract from” commitments under existing 
FTAs.106  This approach poses the challenges to eliminate the noodle bowl syndrome of Asian 
FTAs.  In addition, given “the different levels of development,” the RCEP will allow for flexibility 
by incorporating SDT provisions.107  As RCEP members accepted India’s request for adopting the 
single-undertaking approach, the degree of policy space accorded to LDCs will be a critical trade-
off for partners to reach consensus.108   
Political complexity and capacity constraints have added further complications to the RCEP.  
As of 2017, RCEP negotiations were finalized for the chapter on economic and technical 
cooperation and the chapter on small and medium-sized enterprises.109  The core components that 
require the “Grand Bargain” to involve trade in goods, trade in services and investment will 
determine whether the RCEP can be completed as the new “ASEAN++” architecture by 2018.110  
The increase from 60 to 800 negotiators from 16 countries illustrates the complexity of RCEP 
talks. 111   The insertion of ongoing negotiation of the China-Japan-Korea FTA into RCEP 
negotiations made the dynamics more intricate. 112   Equally significant, certain governments’ 
limited capacity has hindered officials from negotiating ROOs and trade facilitation in parallel 
working group meetings.113  Another hindrance is that political issues, which cause conflicts 
                                                          
106 Guiding Principles, supra note 44, principles 2 & 5. 
107 Id. principle 4. 
108 Sen, supra note 96. 
109  Joint Media Statement, The Third Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Intersessional 
Ministerial Meeting (2017), at 1. 
110 See Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for Future Negotiations, in THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 285, 285-89 (Daniel 
L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds. 2002) (illustrating the “Grand Bargain” negotiations); Fukunaga, supra 
note 58, at 107-08 (explaining the ASEAN+1 and AESAN++ frameworks). 
111 Iman Pambagyo, RCEP: Progress, Challenges & Outlook, PPT Slides [RCEP Slides], at 6; Trade Ministers in Asia-
Pacific to Gather in RoK for RCEP Talks, VOICE OF VIETNAM, Oct. 24, 2017, http://english.vov.vn/economy/trade-
ministers-in-asiapacific-to-gather-in-rok-for-rcep-talks-360918.vov. 
112 RCEP Slides, supra note 111, at 11. 
113 See id. at 7 (observing that “same officials in charge of 2 or more WG/SWGs (i.e., ROO & CPTF)”). 
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between trade liberalization and constitutional constraints, can only be handled at the ministerial 
level.114   
Below I will analyze the legal implications for the RCEP’s critical areas.  From a comparative 
law perspective, the trade in goods issues are to be discussed with uneven tariff concessions and 
low utilization rates of ASEAN+1 FTAs, as well as the impact of the RCEP on fragmented ROOs.  
Services commitments are to be discussed with constitutional challenges and ASEAN’s legal 
structure of professional mobility.  By examining the legal positions of Australia, China, India, 
Indonesia and the EU, investment matters focus on the contentious investor-state arbitration 
mechanisms. 
A. Tariff Eliminations and the Rules of Origin 
Tariff cuts are the most transparent aspect of trade liberalization.  The existing analyses on 
tariff eliminations under ASEAN+1 FTAs often neglect the drastic tariff reductions in the ASEAN 
Economic Community.  To achieve the RCEP’s goal of “the high level of tariff liberalization” and 
consolidation of Asian FTAs, going beyond the tariff concessions under ASEAN+1 FTAs and the 
intra-ASEAN ATIGA is paramount.115  A comparison of five external FTAs readily demonstrates 
that the AANZFTA is the most liberalized FTA, achieving 95.7% of the average tariff elimination 
coverage.116  The result is by no means a surprise, given the developed nation status of Australia 
and New Zealand and their progressive FTA trajectories.   
                                                          
114 There are three working levels at RCEP negotiations: Working Groups for technical issues, the Trade Negotiation 
Committee for policy/legislative issues and the Ministers for political/constitutional issues.  Id. at 12.   
115 Guiding Principles, supra note 44, sec. I. 
116 Fukunaga & Isono, supra note 6, at 8. 
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In contrast, India’s conservative posture made the ASEAN-India the lowest-level FTA, with 
79.6% coverage. 117   Under the ASEAN-India FTA, the average coverage of ASEAN states 
exceeds 90%, but Indonesia’s tariff liberalization is merely 48.7%.118  The AEC’s most noteworthy 
achievement is ASEAN-6 countries’ elimination of 98.9% of tariff lines and CLMV countries’ 
phase in of remaining duties for sensitive products by 2018.119  Consequently, I propose that the 
AANZFTA and the ATIGA should serve as the bases for RCEP tariff commitments.  
Streamlining tariff eliminations of India, Indonesia and CLMV countries would make the 
RCEP the model for South-based FTAs.  As evidenced by the ASEAN-India FTA and the bilateral 
FTAs of Japan and Korea with ASEAN countries, agricultural trade liberalization is key to the 
RCEP.120   The AANZFTA provides the best practices, as it eliminated tariffs on substantial 
agricultural products when the agreement took effect.121  To be a comprehensive FTA, the RCEP’s 
breakthrough in agriculture relies upon two key factors: the tariff elimination timeframes and 
potential market access.   
The tariff phase-in periods, which extend to 18 years under the ASEAN-Japan FTA and 30 
years under the TPP, exemplify critical trade-offs for the RCEP.122  In terms of market access, 
                                                          
117 Id. 
118  Id.; Sanchita Basu Das & Masahiro Kawai, Introductory Overview: Trade Regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: 
Developments and Future Challenges, in TRADE REGIONALISM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE 
CHALLENGES 1, 9 (Sanchita Basu Das & Masahiro Kawai eds. 2016). 
119 AEC Blueprint 2015, supra note 51, at 7; AEC 2025 CSAP, supra note 82, at 2; see also ASEAN Trade in Goods 
Agreement, http://investasean.asean.org/index.php/page/view/asean-free-trade-area-
agreements/view/757/newsid/872/asean-trade-in-goods-agreement.html (last visited July 26, 2017) (“Cambodia, Lao 
PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam have reduced their import duties to 0-5 percent on 98.86 percent of their tariff lines.”). 
120 See Timothy E. Josling, Agriculture, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND 
ANALYSIS 171, 194 (Simon Lester et. al. eds. 2015) (explaining Japan’s FTA with Thailand and the Philippines and 
Korea’s FTA with Thailand). 
121 Tariff eliminations take place from 2010 to 2020.  Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Asian FTAs: Trends, 
Prospects, and Challenges, ADB Economics Working Paper Series, No. 226 (2010), at 16; OECD Review of 
Agricultural Policies OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Indonesia (2012), at 192. 
122 Urata, supra note 38, at 15.  Canada, Japan and the United States are allowed to eliminate tariffs in 12-30 years 
under the TPP.  Matthias Helble, Salvaging the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Building Blocks for Regional and 
Multilateral Trade Opening, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 695 (2017), at 10.  
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keeping Japan’s TPP commitment that raises its quota for Australian rice would be linked to the 
export of Japanese vehicles.123  In 2016, India proposed a three-tiered tariff approach that grants 
RCEP countries 42.5%-80% tariff cuts, depending on three different categories.124  The motivation 
was India’s defensive position on agriculture and the significant $52.7 billion trade deficit with 
China.125  New Delhi subsequently dropped the proposal because of RCEP members’ objections 
and India’s reassessed gains in services and investment under the pact. 
As the largest mega-regional initiative, the RCEP’s harmonization of ASEAN+1 FTAs and the 
ATIGA impacts the businesses’ utilization of the FTAs.  In comparison, NAFTA’s usage rate 
surpasses 60%, but the utilization rate of Asian FTAs is only 28%.126  The strikingly low usage of 
ASEAN+1 FTAs, such as 5.1% of the ASEAN-India FTA for exporters and 2.3% of the ASEAN-
Japan FTA for importers, has nullified the legal efforts for preferential tariff treatment.127  The 
most used ASEAN FTAs are the ATIGA in exports and the ASEAN-China FTA in imports, with 
a utilization rate of only slightly above 30% for each.128  Conventional answers to this problem are 
the limited access to the FTA information, low preference margins compared with MFN tariffs 
and complex ROOs.129  An oft-neglected factor is the expanded commitments of the Information 
                                                          
123  TPP Outcomes at a Glance, Dec. 8, 2016, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/outcomes-
documents/Pages/outcomes-at-a-glance.aspx. 
124  Asit Ranjan Mishra, India’s New Stance at RCEP May Benefit China, LIVEMINT, Aug. 9, 2016, 
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/qGEPZqVoHO4U4YYvfBgCNP/Indias-new-stance-at-RCEP-may-benefit-
China.html (“[India] proposed 80% tariff cuts to [ASEAN] countries, 65% to South Korea and Japan and finally 42.5% 
tariff liberalization to China, Australia and New Zealand with which it does not have free-trade agreements”). 
125 Id.; India Changes Tack on RCEP Negotiations, Oct. 31, 2016, http://www.bilaterals.org/?india-changes-tack-on-
rcep. 
126 Jaime de Melo, Developing Countries in the World Economy 280 (2015); Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, 
Main Findings and Policy Implications, in ASIA’S FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: HOW IS BUSINESS RESPONDING? 33, 34 
(2011).  See also FTAs in South-east Asia: Towards the Next Generation (2014), at 5-6 (indicating that the average 
utilization rate of FTAs concluded by four selected ASEAN countries is 26%). 
127 Lili Yan Ing et. al., How Do Exports and Imports Affect the Use of Free Trade Agreements? Firm-level Survey 
Evidence from Southeast Asia, in THE USE OF FTAS IN ASEAN: SURVEY-BASED ANALYSIS 1, 7 (2015). 
128 Id.; The usage of the ATIGA is presumably undermined by the uneven utilization by ASEAN states.  Lili Yan Ing 
& Olivier Cadot, Facilitating ASEAN Trade in Goods, ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2016), at 11. 
129 FTAs in South-east Asia: Towards the Next Generation (2014), at 8; Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 126, at 39-40. 
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Technology Agreement, a plurilateral WTO agreement that eliminates tariffs on IT products.130  
As 11 RCEP partners are parties to the Agreement, zero tariff treatment for electronic devices 
renders the use of FTAs redundant.131 
Complex and distinct ROOs in overlapping Asian FTAs have contributed to the noodle bowl 
syndrome and inhibited FTA usage.  Built on the ROO reform agenda in the AEC Blueprint 2025, 
the RCEP should consolidate the best practices of regional ROOs. 132   Change in Tariff 
Classification (CTC) and Regional Value Content (RVC) are the most common ROOs in ASEAN 
FTAs.133  While the former qualitatively assesses whether the products are classified under tariff 
schedules different from original materials, the latter quantitatively examines whether the products 
meet the FTA value-added thresholds.134 
Failure to meet the ROOs would disqualify exporters from receiving the certificate of origin 
for FTA preferences.  The ATIGA and most ASEAN+1 FTAs have adopted the flexible co-equal 
rule, which permits ROOs to be satisfied by either the CTC or the RVC.135  The ASEAN-India 
FTA is now the sole exception to the rule after the 2015 protocol to the ASEAN-China FTA that 
had its ROO requirement relaxed to a CVC or RVC of 40%.136  In terms of the certificates of origin, 
all of the five ASEAN+1 FTAs have permitted third-country invoicing and movement certificates, 
                                                          
130 The case of Philippine firms, see Ganeshan Wignaraja, FTAs and Philippine Business: Evidence from Transport, 
Food, and Electronics Firms, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 185 (2010), at 4 & 16-18. 
131  Schedules of Concessions, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/itscheds_e.htm (last visited July 27, 
2017). 
132 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 3; AEC 2025 CSAP, supra note 82, at 3. 
133 The list of rules of origin in ASEAN FTAs, see Das et. al., supra note 6, at 267; INAMA & SIM, supra note 52, at 
41-44; Fukunaga & Isono, supra note 6, at 12. 
134  Jong Bum Kim, The Evolution of Preferential Rules of Origin in ASEAN RTAs: A Guide to Multilateral 
Harmonization, 46:6 J. WORLD TRADE 1343, 1358-59 (2012); INAMA & SIM, supra note 52, at xvi-xvii. 
135 The ATIGA’s rules of origin (ROO) are based on the rules of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).  In 2003, the AFTA 
Council changed ASEAN’s ROO, which was limited to the regional value content of 40%, to include the change in 
tariff classification.  Joint Media Statement of the 17th AFTA Council Meeting (2013), paras. 11-12; INAMA & SIM, 
supra note 52, at 27. 
136 A Guide to Understanding the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area Upgrade (2016), at 2; see also Kim, supra note 134, 
at 1361 (explaining the restrictiveness of the “RVC 35% and CTSH” rule under the ASEAN-India FTA). 
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so that exporters can manage foreign exchange risks and logistics operations.137  These evolved 
practices and harmonized ROOs provide the model for the RCEP. 
Additionally, the RCEP will consolidate the regional supply chain by filling the ROO gap 
among ASEAN FTAs.  To illustrate, Chinese automotive companies plan to expand their 
operations in Thailand by assembling completely knocked-down units imported from China and 
exporting finalized cars to Indonesia and Australia.138  The ROOs of the AANZFTA, the ATIGA 
and the ASEAN-China FTA apply the RVC of 40% for automotive parts and vehicles.139  While 
the completed cars sold in ASEAN are entitled to ATIGA or ASEAN-China FTA preferences, 
those exported to Australia may be denied preferential tariffs under the AANZFTA.  The legal 
obstacle occurs because the AANZFTA’s “cumulative provision” does not recognize the value of 
the cars’ Chinese components for the RVC calculation.140  In other words, the lack of the linkage 
between the ATIGA and ASEAN+1 FTAs obstructs the needs of contemporary transactions.  
Consequently, an ASEAN+6 cumulative provision under the RCEP will consolidate ASEAN 
FTAs and propel the paradigm change in Asian regionalism. 
B. Services Liberalization and Professional Mobility 
                                                          
137 The various certificates of origin in ASEAN FTAs, see Kohei Shino, How Far Will Hong Kong’s Accession to 
ACFTA Impact its Trade in Goods, ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2013), at 12-19; Erlinda M. Medalla & Maureen 
Ane D. Rosellon, Rules of Origin in ASEAN+1 Free Trade Agreements and the Supply Chain in East Asia, in ASEAN 
AND REGIONAL FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 171, 180 (Christopher Findlay ed. 2015). 
138 I use SAIC Motor’s business plan as an example.  Hiroshi Kotani, China’s SAIC Motor to Make Thailand an Export 
Hub, NIKKEI ASIAN REV., May 17, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/AC/China-s-SAIC-Motor-to-make-
Thailand-an-export-hub. 
139 Erlinda M. Medalla & M. Supperamaniam, Suggested Rules of Origin Regime for EAFTA, Discussion Paper Series, 
No. 2008-22 (2009 rev.), at 15; Annex 2 (Product Specific Rules), as Amended by the First Protocol, Agreement 
Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA [AANZFTA], at 590-91. 
140 AANZFTA, ch. 3, art. 6.  Cumulative provisions in other ASEAN+1 FTAs, see Baldwin & Kawai, supra note 36, 
at 18.  Another important step is for the RCEP to clarify the roll-up concept in applying the cumulative provision.  
Article 54.2 of the ATIGA does not provide clear guidance.  INAMA & SIM, supra note 52, at 22-23.  See also Trade 
Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat: Singapore, WT/TPR/S/343, June 7, 2016, at 20 
(elaborating that the EU-Singapore FTA permits “the sourcing from other ASEAN countries as originating content” 
for selected products). 
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The significance of trade in services is no less than that of tariff eliminations.  In Third 
Regionalism, financial and logistics services underpin cross-border trade in goods.  The intimate 
correlation between the two modes of trade is evidenced by a 10% growth in trade in services 
augmenting trade in goods by 6%.141  To implement RCEP countries’ commitments to the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals, services trade is essential to development policy that eradicates 
poverty and increases employment. 142   For RCEP members such as Malaysia and Thailand, 
modernizing services will enable them to escape from the “middle income trap” that stagnates 
economy due to the eroding labor-intensive advantage.143  In developing countries and LDCs, 
foreign direct investments (FDIs) are increasingly associated with services providers that help 
buttress the welfare of the poor through job creation.144  Labor mobility results in remittances, 
which also benefit the Global South for development purposes. 
The TPP’s unforeseen future and the fact that no ASEAN countries are participating in the 
WTO Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiations enable the RCEP to set the standards for 
Asian FTAs.145  Based on “the GATS and ASEAN+1 FTAs,” the RCEP’s target is to “substantially 
eliminate” barriers to services trade.146  To ensure ASEAN centrality, the RCEP should take 
evolving AFAS commitments into account.  The AFAS’s “package” structure is similarly 
                                                          
141 Juan Blyde & Natalia Sinyavskaya, The Impact of Liberalizing Trade in Services on Trade in Goods: An Empirical 
Investigation, 11:3 REV. DEV. ECON. 566, 573 (2007). 
142 The Sustainable Development Goals that took effect in 2016 were built upon Millennium Development Goals that 
governed the development agenda from 2000 to 2015.  Draft Outcome Document of the United Nations Summit for 
the Adoption of the Post-2105 Development Agenda, A/69/L.85, Aug. 12, 2015, at 3-27. 
143 Tran Van Tho, The Middle-Income Trap: Issues for Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ADBI 
Working Paper Series, No. 421 (2013), at 22-29; Kenichi Ohno, The Middle Income Trap: Implications for 
Industrialization Strategies in East Asia and Africa, GRIP Development Forum (2008), at 93-112. 
144 See e.g., Mode 3 – Commercial Presence, S/C/W/314, Apr. 7, 2010 [Mode 3], at 9 (“[S]ervices accounted for 65 
per cent of developing economies’ inward FDI stock and for 86 per cent of their outward FDI . . . .”). 
145 Australia, Japan, Korea and New Zealand are parties to the Trade in Services Agreement.  Sherry Stephenson, 
Implications of the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) for Developing Countries, DIE Discussion Paper (2016), at 
50. 
146 Guiding Principles, supra note 44, sec. II. 
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incorporated in ASEAN’s FTAs with China and Korea.147   ASEAN+1 FTAs cover services 
commitments except for the ASEAN-Japan FTA.148  Although the 2014 ASEAN-India Services 
Agreement is the latest services pact in external FTAs, its core commitments in financial and 
transport services rarely exceed the WTO level.149   
Contrary to the conventional understanding that ASEAN states committed most in the 
comprehensive AANZFTA, intra-ASEAN commitments in the seventh package of AFAS 
commitments for the first time exceeded those under the AANZFTA.150  Moreover, although the 
low degree of the first package of commitments under the ASEAN-China FTA suffers from 
“GATS-minus” situations, the second package has brought it up to par with the ASEAN-Korea 
FTA.151  These developments exhibit that AFAS commitments should form the benchmark for the 
RCEP.  The package structure could also prevent repeating the TPP and TTIP mistakes that aimed 
to achieve high-standard services liberalization without an incremental approach in light of 
protectionist politics. 
With respect to the modality of services liberalization, the AFAS and ASEAN+1 FTAs adopt 
the GATS-like positive list approach, whereas EU and US FTAs, such as the TPP, employ the 
negative list approach.  While the positive list modality allows FTA partners to retain regulatory 
                                                          
147 Agreement on Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation between 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (2007), arts. 23 & 27; Agreement on 
Trade in Services of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments 
of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Republic of Korea (2007), arts. 24 & 
26. 
148 The ASEAN-Japan FTA has not included a services agreement.  
149 The analysis of services commitments made by India and ASEAN states, see Factual Presentation: Agreement on 
Trade in Services between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Services), WT/REG372/1, Aug. 22, 
2016, at 18-37. 
150 Fukunaga & Isono, supra note 6, at 16.  Although ASEAN states concluded the ninth package of commitments 
under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), the most current AFAS data are based on the eighth 
package of commitments.  RCEP Slides, supra note 111, at 10; Hikari Ishido, Harmonization of Trade in Services by 
APEC Members, IDE Discussion Paper, No. 410 (2013), at 8-16. 
151 Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Assessing the Progress of Services Liberalization in the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 
(ACFTA), ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2013), at 3-9; RCEP Slides, supra note 111, at 10. 
Pasha L. Hsieh, 51:3 Cornell Int’l L. J. (forthcoming 2018) 
33 
 
 
sovereignty to schedule services commitments, the more aggressive negative list approach will 
enhance transparency and cover newly developed services.152  Remarkably, the China-Korea FTA 
signals China’s first use of the negative list approach and indicates its changing position in services 
commitments.153  In the bilateral FTA, China and Australia scheduled their commitments on 
positive and negative lists, respectively.154  However, Beijing agreed to follow the negative list 
modality in the subsequent round of negotiations.155 
A different hybrid mechanism is included in the positive list-based Malaysia-New Zealand 
FTA, under which Malaysia agreed to “commence re-negotiation of the specific commitments” if 
it concludes an agreement on a negative list with a third country.156  These dynamics and the 
collective lobbying of four TiSA members influenced the RCEP to be negotiated under an 
innovative positive list formula with “value added” components. 157   This approach provides 
guidance for South-based regionalism because it incorporates negative list advantages without 
overly compromising regulatory sovereignty.  New components include the “ratchet” that imposes 
a standstill by disallowing future governments from adopting more restrictive measures, as well as 
                                                          
152 Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauvé, Services, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A 
HANDBOOK 235, 251-52 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur eds. 2011). 
153 See Heng Wang, The Challenges of China’s Recent FTA: An Anatomy of the China-Korea FTA, 50:3 J. WORLD 
TRADE 417, 418 (2016) (“[I]t is the first time that China will commit to conduct FTA negotiations on a negative list 
for services and investment.”). 
154  Factual Presentation: Free Trade Agreement between Australia and China (Goods and Services), 
WT/REG369/1/Rev.1, Nov. 14, 2016, at 24. 
155 FTA between the Government of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (2015), art. 
8.24(3). 
156 Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, Malaysia, WT/TPR/S/292, Jan. 27, 2014, at 32 & 104; Malaysia-
New Zealand FTA (2009), art. 8.15(2). 
157 Ninth Meeting of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Working Group on Trade in Services (9 th 
RCEP - WGTIS), Aug. 3-7, 2015 [RCEP Services Chapter], at 3; Jane Kelsey, Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) Services Chapter: Risks for Developing Countries’ and LDCS’ Policy Space and Regulatory 
Sovereignty (2016), at 2-7. 
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the MFN-forward design, which requires a RCEP country to automatically extend any services 
concessions under its prospective bilateral agreements to other RCEP members.158 
As for substantive commitments, the RCEP will be modeled after the GATS and the AFAS 
that cover four modes of the services trade: Mode 1 (cross-border supply), Mode 2 (consumption 
abroad), Mode 3 (commercial presence), and Mode 4 (movement of natural persons or MNP).159  
ASEAN+1 FTAs reflect the WTO trend.  Mode 2, which seldom involves hard bargains, is most 
committed, whereas professional mobility under Mode 4 is least committed.160  The existing 
literature rarely addresses the potential constitutional challenges to services negotiations.  For 
example, Article 12 of the Philippine Constitution and Article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution 
mandate that natural resources be “owned by” or “controlled by the State.”161  These provisions 
may outlaw the RCEP’s Mode 3 foreign equity reforms in mining and forest sectors.  The 
Philippines’ constitutional principle that confines professional practice to citizens equally 
challenges Mode 4 liberalization.162   The RCEP’s external pressure to remove constitutional 
obstacles will similarly benefit ASEAN integration. 
In my view, to accelerate much-needed professional mobility in the Asia-Pacific and refute the 
prevalent low-level contention, the RCEP should be built upon the AEC’s Mode 4 commitments 
and mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs).  This focus will create TPP-plus benefits for the 
                                                          
158 RCEP Services Chapter, supra note 157, at 3-5; Kelsey, supra note 157, at 8-9. 
159 GATS (1994), art. I:2. 
160 Mode 3, supra note 144, at 17; Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4), S/C/W/301, Sept. 15, 2009, at 20-25; Ishido, 
supra note 150, at 24. 
161 The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1987), art. XII, secs. 2 & 10; The Constitution of the Republic 
of Indonesia (1945), art. 33(3).  Potential constitutional interpretations, see Stephen L. Magiera, International 
Investment Agreements and Investor-State Disputes: A Review and Evaluation for Indonesia, ERIA Discussion Series 
(2017), at 36; Ponciano S. Intal Jr., AEC Blueprint Implementation Performance and Challenges: Investment 
Liberalization, ERIA Discussion Paper Series (2015), at 9 & 17. 
162 Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat: The Philippines: Revision, WT/TPR/S/261/Rev. 2, May 9, 2012, 
at x & 95-96; see The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1987), art. XII, sec. 14 (“The practice of all 
professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.”). 
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Global South.  Other than the poverty reduction effect of remittances, circular migration has 
brought back skills that modernize the economies of the original countries.163  Despite the pro-
development effect, the WTO’s liberalization over the MNP was restrictive because of the concern 
about creating the back door to immigration.  This unfounded misconception has also amounted 
to global protectionism.   
In terms of Mode 4, US FTAs turned drastically conservative after Singapore and Chile FTAs 
allocated additional quotas for work visas.164  Among ASEAN+1 FTAs, the AANZFTA is by far 
the only one that includes an MNP chapter.165  Even the most recent ASEAN-India Services 
Agreement merely provides definitions of natural persons without substantive MNP provisions.166  
On the bilateral level, the most notable example is the movement of nurses and care workers under 
Japan’s FTAs with four ASEAN states.167  Nevertheless, limited sectors in the commitments and 
legal obstacles, such as qualification and language requirements, have impeded the intended 
results.168 
The RCEP negotiators have discussed the possibility of including a MNP chapter or annex.169  
The AEC’s goal to facilitate the movement of “skilled” labor rather than all “natural persons” 
                                                          
163 Simon Feeny & Mark McGillivray, The Role of ASEAN Connectivity in Reducing the Development Gap, in 
NARROWING THE DEVELOPMENT GAP IN ASEAN: DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS 84, 113 (Mark McGillivray & David 
Carpenter eds. 2013); Regional Conference on Services Trade Liberalization and Labor Migration Policies in ASEAN: 
Towards the ASEAN Economic Community (2008), at 8. 
164  Sherry Stephenson & Gary Hufbauer, Labor Mobility, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 275, 281-83 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe Maur eds. 2011). 
165 See R.V. Anuradha, Liberalization of Trade in Services under RCEP: Mapping the Key Issues, 8:2 ASIAN J. WTO 
& INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 401, 416-7 (2013) (explaining Modes 3 and 4 in Asian FTAs). 
166 Factual Presentation: Agreement on Trade in Services between India and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (Services), supra note 149, at 16. 
167 While the Japan-Thailand FTA only provides a framework for future negotiations, Japan’s FTAs with Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam include commitments on nurses and caretakers.  Trade Policy Review: Report by the 
Secretariat: Japan, WT/TPR/S/351, Jan. 18, 2017, at 125-27. 
168 To gain better residency conditions, ASEAN workers that entered Japan under FTAs are required to take the 
examinations.  However, “[t]he rate of success . . .  is around 35% for caretakers and slightly over 10% for nurses.”  
Id. at 126-27. 
169 See also RCEP Services Chapter, supra note 157, at 6 (noting that “ASEAN has no consensus position on this issue 
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could provide guidance for the mega-regional agreement.170  Under the AEC Blueprint 2025, the 
ASEAN MNP Agreement and MRAs liberalize professional mobility.171  The Agreement, which 
will supersede AFAS Mode 4 commitments, encompasses services trade on a non-permanent basis.  
To avoid immigration concerns, it resembles the GATS by excluding ASEAN governments’ 
“measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market” and “measures 
regarding citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis.”172  In other words, the 
governments retain their regulatory power to maintain visa requirements for public purposes, 
provided that the treaty benefits are not impaired.173   
Furthermore, the implementation of ASEAN MRAs that cover eight professions provide 
valuable experiences.174  Compared with APEC and TPP’s soft-law schemes, the ASEAN pacts 
on engineering and architecture services are most conspicuous.175  The regional level professional 
institutions and national regulatory bodies have created a three-step registration process.  For 
instance, an engineer who meets the educational and experience requirements can be first certified 
by the domestic body, which submits the application to the ASEAN committee.176  Upon approval 
                                                          
yet” and “India had submitted a text for MNP” previously). 
170 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 10-11; ASEAN Agreement on the Movement of Natural Persons (2012) 
[ASEAN MNP Agreement], preamble.  
171 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 10-11; AEC 2025 CSAP, supra note 82, at 10-11. 
172 ASEAN MNP Agreement, art. 2:2. 
173 Id. art 2:3. 
174  From 2005 to 2014, eight ASEAN mutual recognition arrangements (MRAs) were concluded and apply to 
engineering, nursing, architectural, dental, medical, tourism and accounting services.  The Long Road Ahead: Status 
Report on the Implementation of the ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangements on Professional Services (2017), at 
1. 
175 TPP, art. 10.9 & Annex 10-A; see Reinventing Mutual Recognition Arrangements: Lessons from International 
Experiences and Insights for the Asian Region (2017), at 32-33 (demonstrating that only four architects registered 
under the APEC framework); ASEAN Integration Report 2015 (2015), at 24 (“To date, there are a total of 1,252 
engineers on the ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineers Register and 284 architects on the ASEAN Architect 
Register.”). 
176 ASEAN MRA on Engineering Services (2005), art. 3. 
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as an “ASEAN Chartered Professional Engineer,” the engineer is qualified to apply to be a foreign 
engineer in another ASEAN country.177 
The ASEAN MRA on tourism professionals exemplifies a rare scheme that facilitates 
“unregulated” services due to the absence of international standards for tourism services providers. 
The MRA not only created a database to assist registered tourism professionals, but also 
consolidated the regional tourism industry by developing competency standards for 32 job titles.178  
ASEAN’s experiences in Mode 4 liberalization and MRAs are integral to the RCEP, which aims 
to achieve “comprehensive” services commitments.179  Given the procrastinated status of the TPP 
and the TiSA, the AEC’s consolidation of commitments in the prospective ASEAN Trade in 
Services Agreement will further prompt the RCEP to fortify services trade in the Asia-Pacific.180  
C. Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Trade in goods, trade in services and investment form cardinal pillars of the RCEP.  Investment 
law and policy is critical to FDI inflows that catalyze pro-poor development in the Global South.  
Given the slowing Chinese economy, ASEAN overtook China in attracting FDI for the first time 
in 2013.181  Under the AEC Blueprint 2025, ASEAN will strengthen the ACIA-based investment 
regime to enhance its regional competitiveness.182  As of 2017, ASEAN and other six countries 
                                                          
177 Id.; Deunden Nikomborirak & Supunnavadee Jitdumrong, ASEAN Trade in Services, in THE ASEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY: A WORK IN PROGRESS 95, 104-05 (Sanchita Basu Das ed. 2013). 
178 A person who possesses a tourism certificate issued by a national agency in compliance with MRA requirements 
can be recognized as a “Foreign Tourism Professional” in another ASEAN state.  ASEAN MRA on Tourism 
Professionals, arts. II-III; ASEAN Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Tourism Professionals (MRA) – Handbook 
(2013), at 18. 
179 Guiding Principles, supra note 44, sec. II. 
180 See AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 6 (“The next agenda is to [conclude] the ASEAN Trade in Services 
Agreement (ATISA) as the legal instrument for further integration of services sectors in the region.”). 
181 Re-drawing the ASEAN Map: How Companies Are Crafting New Strategies in South-east Asia (2017), at 4. 
182 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 7. 
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agreed to expedite bilateral or plurilateral negotiations, including investment liberalization, on a 
request and offer basis.183 
One should note that the signing of the ASEAN-India Investment Agreement left the ASEAN-
Japan FTA the sole ASEAN+1 FTA without an investment component.184  RCEP negotiations on 
investment “promotion, protection, facilitation and liberalization” are built upon the intra-ASEAN 
ACIA and external ASEAN FTAs. 185   Nevertheless, these instruments vary in substantive 
provisions on covered investments, MFN and national treatment, and compensation following 
expropriation.186  The most contentious investment issue that may amount to a “deal breaker” is 
ISDS provisions, which entitle foreign investors to sue host states in international judicial bodies.  
ISDS was initially designed to overcome the local court bias and the hurdle for exercising 
diplomatic protection by investors’ home states in public international law.  The ICSID 
Convention crystalized the multilateral efforts to adjudicate investor-state disputes under the 
auspices of the World Bank.187   However, four RCEP members (India, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam) are not parties to the Convention.188   
In line with the universal trend, Asian BITs and FTAs often include ISDS provisions because 
they are perceived to incentivize investments.189  The ACIA and ASEAN+1 FTAs follow the 
                                                          
183  ASEAN Economic Ministers to Step up RCEP negotiations, Sept. 11, 2017, http://wtocenter.vn/other-
agreement/asean-economic-ministers-step-rcep-negotiations; RCEP Slides, supra note 111, at 12. 
184 Nonetheless, Japanese enterprises can resort to existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or investment chapters 
of bilateral FTAs.  For investor-state dispute settlement provisions in ASEAN+1 FTAs, see Magiera, supra note 161, 
at 27. 
185 Guiding Principles, supra note 44, sec. III.   
186 Das et. al., supra note 6, at 271-72; Luke Nottage, The Investment Chapter and ISDS in the TPP: Lessons from 
Southeast Asia, ISEAS Economics Working Paper, No. 2017-2 (2017), at 15-17. 
187 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, the ICSID 
Convention, was ratified by 153 states.  List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention (as of April 
12, 2016), ICSID/3. 
188 Id. 
189 Asian Economic Integration Report (2016), at 166 (stating that such provisions could “increase greenfield FDI 
projects into Asia by 28.5%”).  Cf. Robert Howse, International Investment Law and Arbitration: A Conceptual 
Framework, IILJ Working Paper 2017/1 (MegaReg Series), at 21-22. Rare exceptions also exist in recent agreements, 
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modality of the US Model BIT and the NAFTA and go beyond earlier BITs by incorporating more 
detailed arbitration procedures than the ICSID Convention.190  In reality, the “ASEAN way” and 
the fear of undermining relations with the governments have deterred foreign investors from filing 
complaints against host states.  Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar remains the only case that arose from 
ASEAN FTAs.191  A Singaporean company challenged the Myanmar government’s expropriation 
of a joint venture brewery, but the Tribunal dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds based on 
the interpretation of pre-ACIA agreements.192 
In Third Regionalism, the soaring number of investor-state disputes has shaped the NREO and 
the stance of the Global South.  Since the 2000s, reported ISDS cases have increased fivefold, and 
the number of Asia-Pacific states as respondents doubled the number as claimants.193   ISDS 
provisions became the source of global protectionism and underpin public criticism against FTAs.  
ISDS is perceived to be undemocratic for permitting foreign corporations to bypass domestic 
courts’ jurisdiction.  It is also criticized for creating a “regulatory chill” that makes public policy 
measures vulnerable to foreign investors’ legal challenges. 
The case of Philip Morris v. Australia changed the landscape and resulted in the tobacco carve-
out clause of the TPP’s ISDS provisions.194  In this case, Philip Morris challenged Australia’s plain 
                                                          
such as Australia’s FTAs with the United States and Japan, and the New Zealand-Taiwan FTA.   
190 For the evolution of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) and the AANZFTA, see Zewei 
Zhong, The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement: Realizing a Regional Community, 6:1 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 
1, 4-5 (2011); Amokura Kawharu & Luck Nottage, Models for Investment Treaties in the Asian Region: An Underview, 
Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 16/87 (2016), at 33-34. 
191 Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, 42 I.L.M. 404 (2003). 
192  Id. paras. 4-8 & 76-86.  The dispute involves the interpretations of pre-ACIA investment agreement, the 
1987Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (IGA) and the 1998 Framework Agreement on the 
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). 
193 As of January 2017, there are 767 publicly known investor-state cases.  Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review 
of Developments in 2016 (2017) [ISDS Review], at 2; Trends and Development in Provisions and Outcomes of 
RTA/FTAs Implemented in 2015 by APEC Economies (2016), at 30. 
194 See generally TPP, art. 29.5. 
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cigarette packaging legislation that intends to reduce smoking.195  Although the Virginia-based 
company was unable to resort to the Australia-US FTA that does not include ISDS, corporate 
restructuring entitled its Hong Kong subsidiary to sue Canberra under the Australia-Hong Kong 
BIT.196  In the Tribunal’s view, “this arbitration constitutes an abuse of rights” because the dispute 
was foreseeable to Phillip Morris at the time of the restructuring.197  Despite the result, the case 
incurred public outcry and states’ concerns about regulatory sovereignty and legal expenses.  The 
direct response was the TPP’s exclusion of tobacco control measures.  This carve-out has also been 
adopted in the Australia-Singapore FTA and will likely influence the RCEP’s ISDS design.198  
In addition to Australia’s position, a compromise of RCEP stake-holding countries is of 
significance to the investor-state arbitration mechanisms under South-based FTAs.  India and 
Indonesia are most resistant to “pro-investor” ISDS.  As the No. 1 ISDS target among RCEP 
countries, India has been the respondent in 21 disputes and the amount of compensation that 
investors claimed reached $12.3 billion.199  For example, the Dobhol power plant project dispute 
led US-based Enron, General Electric and Bechtel to file nine cases against India under various 
BITs.200   
                                                          
195 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12 (2015), paras. 7-8 & 89. 
196 Id. paras. 536-70; Julien Chaisse & Shintaro Hamanaka, Understanding Asian Investment Complexity: What to Do 
About It? IDS Discussion Paper No. 626 (2017), at 12-13; Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments 
in 2015 (2016), at 15. 
197 Philip Morris Asia Ltd., supra note 195, para. 580-85. 
198 See Agreement to Amend the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement (2016), art. 22 (“No claim may be brought 
under this Section in respect of a tobacco control measure of a Party.”); Tania S.L. Voon, Consolidating International 
Investment Law: The Mega-Regionals as a Pathway Towards Multilateral Rules, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929145 (last visited Aug. 10, 2017), at 25 (stating that the 
amendment was “modelled on the TPP provision”). 
199 ISDS Review, supra note 193, at 52; see also Cecilia Olivet et. al., The Hidden Costs of RCEP and Corporate Trade 
Deals in Asia (2016), at 3-6 (“India alone has been the target of 40% of the cases filed against RCEP countries.”). 
200 Olivet et. al., supra note 199, at 9-10. 
Pasha L. Hsieh, 51:3 Cornell Int’l L. J. (forthcoming 2018) 
41 
 
 
Other than “losing control” over its energy policy, India lost the case of White Industries, in 
which an Australian company challenged the delays of the Indian judicial system.201  Based on the 
Australia-India BIT’s MFN clause, the Tribunal held that New Delhi breached the obligation under 
its BIT with Kuwait to ensure an “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights.”202  
These incidences led India to redraft the Model BIT that significantly limits the access to ISDS by 
imposing the exhaustion of local remedies as the condition. 203   For similar policy reasons, 
Indonesia has terminated 17 BITs since the government unilaterally abrogated its BIT with the 
Netherlands in 2014.204  In other words, the ACIA, ASEAN+1 FTAs and the RCEP will be the 
primary avenues by which foreign investors can utilize ISDS against Jakarta. 
Contrary to India and Indonesia, Korea and Japan are at the forefront of ISDS proposals in 
RCEP negotiations.205  Their position to “TPP-nize” RCEP ISDS provisions is to ensure that their 
significant investments in India and Southeast Asia are guaranteed.  Notably, China’s evolving 
position on ISDS stands unique in the Global South.  While Beijing’s “Westphalian fundamentalist” 
doctrine continues to apply to territorial disputes in arbitration, it has revamped the ISDS strategy 
in tandem with the increasingly active use of WTO disputes.206  For Beijing, investment arbitration 
benefits the OBOR initiative by protecting outbound Chinese FDIs and can hardly undermine the 
                                                          
201 Final Award, White Industries Australia Limited v. India, UNCITRAL (2011), para. 16.1.1. 
202 Id.; for disputes involving most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses in BITs, see Andrian M. Johnston & Michael J. 
Trebilcock, Fragmentation in International Trade Law: Insights from the Global Investment Regime, 12:4 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 621, 643-47 (2013). 
203 Model Text for the India Bilateral Investment Treaty (2015), at 14.3.  See also David M. Trubek & Sonia, Legal 
Innovation in Investment Law: Rhetoric and Practice in the South, Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 
1406 (2017), at 6-7 (comparing the 2013 and 2015 Model BITs and suggesting that the latter focuses more on 
sovereignty and development). 
204 Magiera, supra note 161, at 4 & 16. 
205  Update on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement – NGO Briefing, Sept. 14, 2015, 
http://bilaterals.org/?update-on-the-regional&lang=en. 
206  I learned of the term “Westphalian fundamentalist” from Professor James Zhaojie Li of China’s Tsinghua 
University in May 2017.  China’s non-participation in the South China Sea Arbitration is a key example.  As of August 
2017, China has 15 WTO cases as a complaint and 140 cases as a third party.  Dispute by Member, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2017). 
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communist leadership.  China’s earlier BITs echo its 1993 reservation to the ICSID Convention 
that confines the jurisdiction of a tribunal to “compensation resulting from expropriation and 
nationalization.” 207   Nonetheless, the Australia-China FTA remarkably expanded the ISDS 
application to cover violations of national treatment obligations.208  Although Beijing has yet to 
push for ISDS provisions vigorously, its changing practice will be critical to the RCEP. 
The US model of ISDS provisions has been the model for ASEAN FTAs.  It was contended 
that the European model may shape the RCEP structure.209  This contention is problematic.  The 
EU’s proposal for creating a multilateral investment court through the appellate mechanism in 
bilateral FTAs has raised concerns about its practicability and implications for developing 
countries.210  Given that the ICSID annulment proceedings are confined to limited grounds, the 
appellate system aims to increase the partiality, transparency and predictability of ISDS awards.211  
Similar to the TPP, the EU-Singapore FTA merely includes references to a potential appellate 
mechanism.212  Washington’s unclear stance that has halted negotiations of the TTIP makes its 
“Appeal Tribunal” provisions futile.213  By far, the EU only succeeded in incorporating its proposal 
in the FTAs with Canada and Vietnam.214 
                                                          
207 Contracting States and Measures Taken by Them for the Purpose of the Convention, ICSID/8-D (2017), at 1; Jie 
(Jeanne) Huang, Silk Road Economic Belt: Can Old BITs Fulfil China’s New Initiative? 50:4 J. WORLD TRADE 733, 
751-52 (2016). 
208 In comparison, ISDS provisions do not apply to MFN treatment.  Free Trade Agreement between the Government 
of Australia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (2015) [Australia-China FTA], arts. 9.3 & 9.4.  
China’s BITs in the late 1990s reflect the same trend to widen the scope of ISDS.  Vivienne Bath, “One Belt, One 
Road” and Chinese Investment, in Legal Dimensions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 165, 177 (Lutz-Christian 
Wolff & Chao Xi eds. 2016). 
209  E.g., Luke Nottage, Towards a European Model for Investor-State Disputes? July 1, 2016, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/01/towards-a-european-model-for-investor-state-disputes/. 
210 The European proposal, see Concept Paper: Investment in TTIP and Beyond – The Path for Reform (2015), at 1-8. 
211 Id.; ICSID Convention, art. 52. 
212 TPP (2016), at 9.23.11; Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Singapore (2015) 
[EUSFTA], art. 9.30.1(c).  For ISDS provisions of the EUSFTA, see Locknie Hsu, EU-ASEAN Trade and Investment 
Relations with a Special Focus on Singapore, 6 EUR. YB INT’L ECO. L. 233, 245-47 (2015). 
213 The European Commission, Draft Text of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (2015), art. 9. 
214  The Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (2016), art. 8.28; Free Trade Agreement between the 
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The new EU trade policy is to evaluate the resumption of FTA negotiations with Thailand and 
Malaysia and eventually conclude the ASEAN-EU FTA.215  The RCEP negotiators should be 
advised that almost 70% of ISDS cases against their countries were filed by European investors.216  
The potential result that the EU could merely persuade less developed RCEP countries to accept 
the appellate mechanism suggests the neocolonial relationship, which trade dependency theorists 
envisioned.  More fundamentally, the legal dispute that substantially delayed the ratification of the 
EU-Singapore FTA has implications for ASEAN and the RCEP.  The Court of Justice of the 
European Union case concerned whether the EU was entitled to have exclusive competence to 
include ISDS provisions in the FTA and the Court ruled against the EU Commission.217  In the 
Court’s view, the ISDS regime will remove disputes from domestic courts’ jurisdiction and hence 
requires the consent of member states under the shared competence of EU law.218  This decision 
would impose legal obstacles on the EU’s Asian FTAs and limit the impact of the ISDS proposal 
on the RCEP. 
IV. The Systemic Impact on Regional and Multilateral Trading Systems 
This article sheds light on the theoretical underpinning of the NREO, which explains the legal 
strategies of ASEAN, China and India to pursue the RCEP.  The discussion of the core elements 
of the RCEP buttresses the corollaries of the new dependency theory that the assertive legalism of 
the Global South can change its economic and development trajectory.  The RCEP will invigorate 
                                                          
European Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2015), art. 28. 
215 Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (2014), at 31-32. 
216 See Olivet et. al., supra note 199, at 5 (“68% of investors suing RCEP countries are based in [European countries, 
including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France].”). 
217 The interpretation concerns the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  Opinion 2/15 of the Court (Full 
Court) (2017), paras. 3-11 & 305. 
218 Id. paras. 288-293.   
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paradigm changes in Asian FTAs and constitute a normative foundation for the Global South in 
world trade law.   
Notably, the implementation of the AEC and ASEAN+1 FTAs provides the joint impetus for 
the goals of the AEC Blueprint 2025 and the RCEP.  The critical and systemic issues in Third 
Regionalism include normative conflicts of trade fragmentation.  Jurisdictional clashes under 
overlapping agreements inevitably require scrutiny of WTO and VCLT case law.  Equally critical 
matters involve the RCEP’s nexus with the APEC-based FTAAP and the pro-development 
operative mechanism of the 16-country mega-FTA.  These issues are of great significance to 
enhance the contributions of Global South powers to resist populist isolationism and reinvigorate 
the multilateral trading system. 
A. Normative Conflicts of Trade Fragmentation 
The 16-country RCEP will face new dynamics of trade fragmentation in international 
economic law, as the mega-FTA could further complicate the noodle bowl syndrome due to 
overlapping FTAs and BITs.  The RCEP’s consolidation of intra-RCEP trade and investment pacts 
could immensely benefit developing nations and the Doha Round.  Three types of normative 
conflicts amid fragmented trade rules have emerged in Third Regionalism and complicated the 
application of WTO law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.   
First, the conventional phenomenon arises from the jurisdictional clashes between the WTO 
and FTAs.  In Mexico – Soft Drinks, Mexico’s defense relied on the NAFTA’s forum exclusion 
clause when the United States brought a WTO complaint against Mexico’s tax measures.219  
                                                          
219 Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 
Mar. 24, 2006, DSR 2006:I, 3, para. 42. 
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Mexico argued that because the case constituted part of “a broader dispute” it had previously 
brought against Washington in NAFTA proceedings, the forum exclusion clause required the 
NAFTA to be the sole forum for the case.220  The Appellate Body held that a panel’s declining its 
own jurisdiction would “diminish” a complaining party’s right under the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU).221  The Appellate Body further elaborated that although “legal impediments” 
may exclude the WTO’s jurisdiction, such impediments did not exist in the present case.222   
In a more recent case, Peru – Agricultural Products, Guatemala challenged the consistency of 
Peru’s Price Range System with the Agreement on Agriculture and the GATT.223  Peru contended 
that Guatemala violated “good faith” obligations under the DSU, as Guatemala waived the right 
to bring the WTO complaint under their bilateral FTA.224  After scrutinizing paragraph 9 of Annex 
2.3 of the FTA, the Appellate Body ruled that a waiver to relinquish DSU rights “must be made 
clearly” and “cannot be lightly assumed.”225  In other words, such provisions do not constitute the 
“legal impediments” that the Appellate Body explained in Mexico – Soft Drinks.226  Thus, based 
on WTO jurisprudence, even if the RCEP does not incorporate the “supremacy clause” that 
prioritizes the WTO Agreement, a forum exclusion clause can hardly be interpreted to bar the 
WTO’s jurisdiction.227  
                                                          
220 North American Free Trade Agreement (1992), Art. 2005.6. Id., paras. 42 & 54. 
221 Id., paras. 46 & 48-53. 
222 Id., para. 54. 
223 Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS457/AB/R 
and Add.1, adopted July 31, 2015, para. 4.1. 
224 Peru’s argument is based on Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.  Id. para. 5.19. 
225 Id. para. 5.25. 
226 See id. ft. 106 (“[W]e do not consider that Members may relinquish their rights and obligations under the DSU 
beyond the settlement of specific disputes). For further discussion on similar cases and forum shopping issues, see 
generally Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, 
(Im)Possible Solutions, 42:1 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 77 (2009). 
227 See Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership among Member States of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations and Japan (2008) [AJFTA], art. 10.3. (“[T]he WTO Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the 
inconsistency.”) 
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Second, emerging FTA-FTA conflicts have arisen in tandem with proliferating trade pacts in 
Third Regionalism.  FTAs with overlapping geographical scopes led to more complex issues than 
the noodle bowl syndrome due to divergent ROOs.  For example, other than the WTO, Singapore 
could bring an identical complaint against China under the bilateral FTA, the ASEAN-China FTA 
and the RCEP.  Forum shopping is a legal challenge.  In practice, de jure consolidation that enables 
a wider FTA to terminate intra-FTAs is an ideal yet a politically sensitive exercise.  A rare example 
is the Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Area that declared six bilateral FTAs “null 
and void” in 2012.228  During TPP negotiations, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore argued for 
the “clean slate” approach to supersede intra-TPP pacts.229  On the contrary, the United States 
vigorously opposed the proposal in order to keep its existing market access commitments under 
bilateral FTAs, such as FTAs with Australia and Korea.230  The end result is the TPP provision 
that merely allows the FTA “to coexist with” other agreements.231   
A cursory overview of the Guiding Principles for the RCEP suggests the same coexistence 
approach to ASEAN+1 FTAs.232  Nevertheless, the diversity of treaty language reveals more 
intricate interpretations than the TPP.  In their “relations to other agreements” provisions, the 
AANZFTA and the ASEAN-Japan FTA follow the three-phase approach that intra-RCEP bilateral 
FTAs adopted.233  Substantively, “[e]ach party reaffirms its rights and obligations under” existing 
agreements to which they are parties.234  The ASEAN+1 FTA should not “be construed to derogate 
                                                          
228  Notification by the Russian Federation, WT/REG/GEN/N/8, Apr. 1, 2016, at 1-2; Asia-Pacific Trade and 
Investment Report (2016), at 101. 
229 Deborah K. Elms & C.L. Lim, An Overview and Snapshot of the TPP Negotiations, in THE TRANS-PACIFIC 
PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRADE AGREEMENT 21, 37 (Deborah Elms et. al. eds. 2012). 
230 Id. 
231 TPP, art. 1.2.1; see id. (stating that in 2010, the parties to the TPP “essentially decided not to decide.”). 
232 See Guiding Principles, supra note 44, principle 5 (stipulating that ASEAN+1 FTAs and intra-RCEP FTAs “will 
continue to exist”). 
233 E.g., AANZFTA, ch. 18., art. 2.1-2.3; AJFTA, art. 10.1-2 & 4; Australia-China FTA, art. 1.2.1-3. 
234 E.g., AANZFTA, ch. 18., art. 2.1.1 
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from” existing obligations arising from other agreements. 235   Procedurally, a party “shall 
immediately consult with” another party should inconsistency between ASEAN+1 FTAs and other 
agreements materialize.236  
The ASEAN-Japan FTA endorses parallelism of FTAs by stressing the validity of a separate 
agreement between parties if it provides more favorable treatment.237   The “more favorable” 
assessment can be quantitatively determined if a single-issue dispute involves tariffs or a particular 
mode of services trade.  However, multi-issue cases can complicate the qualitative application of 
the “more favorable” proviso. 238   The Korea-Vietnam FTA that identifies “more favorable 
treatment of goods, services, investment, or persons” is an attempt to provide higher certainty and 
could be a basis for the RCEP to detail the conditions.239 
Certain intra-RCEP FTAs, evidenced by the ASEAN-Japan FTA and the China-New Zealand 
FTA, encompass the interpretative role of “international law” in resolving treaty inconsistencies.240  
Article 30 of the VCLT provides the authoritative guide on “successive treaties relating to the same 
subject-matter.”241  The overlapping rights and obligations under the RCEP, ASEAN+1 FTAs and 
bilateral FTAs fall within the ambit of Article 30.  Presumably, the les posterior rule codified in 
Article 30.3 applies to ASEAN+1 FTAs’ three-phase approach, under which “the earlier treaty 
                                                          
235 Id. ch. 18., art. 2.1.2. 
236 Id. ch. 18., art. 2.1.3 
237 AJFTA, art. 10.2. 
238 See also Chang-fa Lo, Coordinating Approach to Resolve Normative and Operational Conflicts between Inner and 
Outer-FTAs, 50:1 J. WORLD TRADE 147, 157-58 (2016) (explaining the interpretations of the “more favorable 
treatment” in the Australia-Japan FTA). 
239 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Government of the 
Republic of Korea (2015), art. 1.3.2. 
240 AJFTA, art. 10.4; Free Trade Agreement between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China (2008), art. 3.2. 
241 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) [VCLT], art. 30.3.  Article 30.2 is inapplicable, as almost none 
of these agreements include “it is subject to” provisions.   
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applies only to the extent that” it is “compatible with” the subsequent treaty.242  Nevertheless, a 
lex specialis argument may exclude the application of Article 30.3 because the FTAs’ three-phase 
provisions can be interpreted as a special law that prevails over the general VCLT rule.243  Even if 
the argument fails, applying the later-in-time rule under Article 30.3 would encounter obstacles 
akin to those raised under the “more favorable” provisions because of the “compatibility” 
assessment in multi-issue claims.   
Finally, modern FTAs that incorporate investment chapters may conflict with coexistent BITs 
in investment-related disputes.  In the overlapping FTA-BIT context, the application of the VCLT 
involves different jurisdictional disputes.  ISDS mechanisms in FTAs and BITs with inconsistent 
scopes and carve-outs make the operation of Article 30.3 difficult.244  Yaung Chi Oo v. Myanmar, 
which concerned the 1987 and 1998 intra-ASEAN investment agreements, exemplified ASEAN 
jurisprudence on successive treaties.245  In the Tribunal’s view, the two agreements in dispute had 
different scopes of investment and ASEAN states had no intention to merge them.246  Article 12 
of the 1998 agreement stipulates that it “shall prevail” if it “provides for better and enhanced 
provisions.” 247   According to “the general practice of ASEAN with respect to successive 
agreements,” the Tribunal held that Article 12 should not be interpreted to amend the 1987 
                                                          
242 Article of 30.3 of the VCLT reflects the later-in-time rule.  See also Alexander Orakhelashvili, Article 30 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Application of the Successive Treaties Relating to the Same Subject-
Matter, 31:2 ICSID REV. 344, 361 (2016) (“[T]o what extent the lex posterior rule stated in Article 30 VCLT would 
be applied in arbitral practice is not certain . . . .”). 
243 This argument, which was raised in the context of the co-existence of the Australia-China FTA and BIT, also applies 
to the FTA-FTA conflicts.  See Tania Voon & Elizabeth Sheargold, Australia, China, and the Co-existence of 
Successive International Investment Agreements, at 13, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2905516 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2017) (discussing the Article 1.2.2 of the China-Australia FTA). 
244 For detailed comparisons of FTAs and BITs, see id. at 3; Jean Ho, Investment Protection under Successive Treaties, 
32:1 ICSID REV. 58, 68-82 (2017). 
245 Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd., supra note 191, paras. 76-78. 
246 Id. paras. 77 & 82. 
247 Id. para. 79. 
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agreement because the two pacts “are clearly intended to operate separately.”248  This decision 
similarly buttresses the difficulty in applying Article 30.3 of the VCLT in practice. 
RCEP negotiators should be aware that similar to FTA-FTA scenarios, de jure consolidation 
that solves FTA-BIT conflict is scarcely used.  Article 9.10 of the EU-Singapore FTA, which will 
terminate 12 BITs between EU states and Singapore, illustrates this approach.249  The China-
Singapore FTA (CSFTA) utilizes a different type of de jure consolidation, which incorporates a 
wider-FTA’s investment obligations. 250   Without its own investment provisions, the CSFTA 
makes the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement under the ASEAN-China FTA “an integral part 
of” the CSFTA.251   
Because only the Investment Agreement provides the ISDS mechanism, no jurisdiction 
conflict exists in relation to the CSFTA.  Yet, legal issues may relate to the China-Singapore BIT, 
which continues to be effective parallel with the CSFTA.  The 1985 BIT limits ISDS to “the 
amount of compensation” and confines the forum to “arbitral tribunals established by both 
parties.”252  A party may well resort to the CSFTA for additional procedural guarantees.  In this 
regard, more detailed provisions under the CSFTA facilitate de facto FTA-BIT consolidation.  This 
approach could enable the RCEP to minimize normative conflicts of trade fragmentation. 
                                                          
248 Id. paras. 80-82. 
249 EUSFTA, art. 9.10.1 & Annex 9-D. 
250  See Wolfgang Alschner, Regionalism and Overlap in Investment Treaty Law: Towards Consolidation or 
Contradiction, 17:2 J. INT’L ECO. L. 271, 282-84 (2014) (elaborating de facto consolidation). The author categorizes 
the China-Singapore FTA as an example of de facto consolidation.  I hold a different view.  Any formal legal approach 
to enabling one of the two or more co-existing agreements to govern the relations between the parties should constitute 
de jure consolidation.  An approach that achieves the same result but without a legal mechanism is de facto 
consolidation.  
251 Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Singapore (2008) [CSFTA], art. 84.1. 
252 China and Singapore Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investment (1985), art. 13.3.  In comparison, 
Article 14 of the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement has more detailed provisions on investment disputes.  Article 
112 of the CSFTA simply affirms parties’ “existing rights and obligations” and does not stipulate the application of 
the FTA and the BIT. 
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B. The RCEP as the Pathway to the FTAAP 
The unsettled path of the TPP and the TTIP amid populist isolationism made the RCEP’s status 
unique.  Reinforcing the NREO argument requires an understanding of the RCEP as the pathway 
to the AEPC-envisioned FTAAP in Third Regionalism.  This analysis not only fills the much-
needed gap in the existing literature, but also benefits the revitalization of the Doha Round.  
Currently, APEC includes 12 parties to the RCEP, which facilitates APEC’s Bogor Goals to 
accomplish Asia-Pacific trade and investment liberalization by 2020.253  APEC’s nature as a soft-
law institution is distinct from FTAs that impose hard-law obligations.  To minimize the 
“sovereign costs,” APEC’s operating basis neither involves the treaty-ratification process nor 
incurs trade retaliation due to a violation of the pacta sunt servanda rule.254   The voluntary 
foundation helped bypass trade politics of regionalism, but resulted in APEC’s institutional 
weaknesses that marginalized its role.   
In 2004, the APEC Business Advisory Council propounded the 21-party FTAAP in order to 
reinvigorate APEC in light of proliferating FTAs.255  After APEC adopted the FTAAP vision in 
2006, the 2010 APEC Leaders’ Declaration identified “ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership” as pathways to the comprehensive trade pact.256  Optimism about the TPP 
echoed the Obama administration’s engagement in P-4 agreement-based TPP negotiations in late 
                                                          
253 APEC 2016-17, supra note 9, at 53; 1994 Leaders’ Declaration, supra note 37. 
254 For the soft-law concept, see generally Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance – and Not 
Trade, 13:3 J. INT’L ECO. L. 623, 631-32; Harmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10:3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 500, 
509. 
255 APEC News Release, Asia Pacific Business Leaders to Press APEC Leaders to Accelerate Regional Economic 
Integration, Feb. 14, 2014, at 1. 
256 Id.; 2010 Leaders’ Declaration, Nov. 13, 2010. 
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2009.257  Notably, the “ASEAN plus” frameworks that “codified” China and Japan’s EAFTA and 
CEPEA proposals were distinct from the RCEP, which underpins ASEAN centrality. 
To enrich the existing literature that only focuses on the TPP-FTAAP nexus, I offer an analysis 
on the RCEP as a more feasible pathway to the FTAAP.  The RCEP first appeared in the Annex 
on the 2014 Beijing Roadmap, in which APEC declared that “the possible pathways to the FTAAP” 
encompass the TPP and the RCEP.258  The US-China rivalry led to the delicate language.  Beijing 
argued vigorously for the FTAAP when it hosted the APEC meetings.259  Washington opposed the 
proposal due to the concern about detracting the TPP and impairing the “pivot to Asia” strategy.260  
The compromise was to pursue APEC’s two-year Collective Strategic Study to revitalize the 
FTAAP under the auspices of China.261  Markedly, APEC urged “the early completion of” RCEP 
negotiations in 2015.262  In the following year, APEC leaders endorsed the FTAAP Study that 
stresses the RCEP’s substantial impact on “the economic landscape of the region and the global 
economy.”263  Thus, APEC has placed the RCEP on par with the TPP as the integral part of the 
FTAAP roadmap, which could rejuvenate the stalled Doha Round negotiations. 
                                                          
257 The predecessor to the TPP is the P-4 (Pacific 4) agreement, which was concluded between Singapore, New 
Zealand, Chile and Brunei in 2006.  Fergusson & Williams, supra note 33, at 1. 
258 Annex A to the 2014 Leaders Declaration: The Beijing Roadmap for APEC’s Contribution to the Realization of the 
FTAAP [Beijing Roadmap]. 
259 Patrick Low, Beijing Must Take a Different Route with the US to Realise FTAAP Goals, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Nov. 13, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1637967/beijing-must-take-different-route-us-
realise-ftaap-goals. 
260 Id.; Shannon Tiezzi, US Pressures China to Kill Asia-Pacific Free Trade Agreement Talks, DIPLOMAT, Nov. 4, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/us-pressures-china-to-kill-asia-pacific-free-trade-agreement-talks/. 
261 See 2014 Leaders Declaration, Nov. 11, 2014 (“We agree to launch a collective strategic study on . . . the FTAAP, 
and instruct officials to undertake the study, consult stakeholders and report the result by the end of 2016”). 
262 2015 Leaders’ Declaration, Nov. 19, 2015. 
263 See 2016 Leaders’ Declaration, Nov. 20, 2016 (“[W]e endorse the Recommendations of the Study as the Lima 
Declaration on FTAAP”).  In comparison, in the assessment of the TPP, the Study merely states the TPP’s signature 
and entry into force issues without “praising” its potential effect.  Collective Strategic Study on Issues Related to the 
Realization of the FTAAP (2016), at 166 & 170. 
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The US withdrawal from the TPP diverted the status of the TPP vis-à-vis the RCEP.  Article 
30.5 of the TPP conditions its entry into force on the approval of countries that account for 85% 
of the combined GDP “of the original signatories,” thus making US membership indispensable.264  
The revision to this provision is a procedural hurdle for the remaining 11 TPP countries to 
overcome under the CPTPP.  Substantively, it is contentious whether countries could retain the 
scope of concessions without having market access to the United States.  For instance, the CPTPP’s 
list of suspended provisions evidence Canada’s cultural exception request and Vietnam’s concerns 
about its IP and labor rights commitments.265  With Australia’s and Mexico’s support, Japan 
became the driving force for the CPTPP.266  Nonetheless, the fact that only Japan and New Zealand 
ratified the TPP and the remaining items to be finalized under the CPTPP may still cast doubt on 
the eventual entry into force of the agreement.267 
While the evolution of the TPP illustrates the structural North-South divide, the relative 
development of the RCEP strengthens the theoretical and substantive arguments for the NREO in 
Third Regionalism.  From the new dependency theory perspective, the RCEP reaffirms the 
assertive legalism of developing nations by enabling new generation South-South FTAs to alter 
                                                          
264 TPP, art. 30.5.2.  US GDP alone constitutes 65.2% of the combined GDP of original TPP 12 countries.  Marina 
Tsirbas et. al., supra note 3, at 14. 
265 Annex II – List of Suspended Provisions, TPP Statement, supra note 9; Vietnam Proposes Amendments to Stalled 
TPP Trade Deal at Sydney Talks: Sources, Aug. 29, 2017, http://bilaterals.org/?vietnam-proposes-amendments-
to&lang=en. 
266  Walter Sim, Australia, Japan Lobby for TPP-11, STRAIT TIMES, Apr. 21, 2017, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/australia-japan-lobby-for-tpp-11; Mexican Minister Supports Japan’s 
Leadership in Achieving TPP without U.S., JAPAN TIMES, July 31, 2017, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/31/business/mexican-minister-supports-japans-leadership-achieving-
tpp-without-u-s/#.Wadwy7IjF0w.  Some countries, such as Singapore, favor the TPP 11 proposal without stressing 
their support for Japanese leadership. 
267 Annex II – List of Suspended Provisions, TPP Statement, supra note 9; New Zealand: Ratification of Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement Completed, May 23, 2017, http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/new-zealand-
ratification-of-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-completed/; The TPP ratification process in 11 countries, see 
Marina Tsirbas et. al., supra note 3, at 15 and U.S. Coalition for TPP Diplomatic Working Group Newsletter, Issue 3, 
Aug. 25, 2016. 
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the subordinate relationship with the North.  The realpolitik of international economic law elevated 
the RCEP from being considered a Plan B for global regionalism to the only “on track” mega-
regional agreement that could considerably impact the multilateral trading system.   
Markedly, the accession to the TPP is restricted to “any State or separate customs territory,” 
which is an APEC member “as the Parties may agree.”268  In comparison, the RCEP’s open 
accession clause, which allows “any ASEAN FTA partner” or “any other external economic 
partners,” could result in a greater impact beyond the FTAAP.269  Pursuant to the AEC Blueprint 
2025, the new ASEAN-Hong Kong FTA constitutes a new ASEAN+1 FTA and will pave the way 
for the Special Administrative Region of China to join the RCEP.270  Furthermore, the 2016 
ASEAN-Pacific Alliance Framework for Cooperation that expedites integration between the AEC 
and Latin America reinforces South-based cooperation.271  The potential coverage of additional 
APEC and TPP members, such as Chile and Peru, can be the building block for the FTAAP and 
transform the RCEP as the new trans-Pacific architecture.272 
C. The Pro-Development Operative Mechanism 
The RCEP stands unique among mega-regionals because of its South-based origin and pro-
development policy.  A functional operative mechanism is essential to construct the RCEP as the 
normative foundation for the Global South.  In line with ASEAN’s commitments to the Doha 
Development Agenda and the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the RCEP will incorporate 
                                                          
268 TPP, art. 30.4. 
269 Guiding Principles, supra note 44, principle 6. 
270 AEC Blueprint 2025, supra note 51, at 35; ASEAN-Hong Kong Statement, supra note 57, at 1.  From a legal aspect, 
Taiwan, as an APEC member, could also join the RCEP if China does not politically oppose.  
271 The Pacific Alliance include four Latin American countries and their bilateral FTAs with ASEAN states serve as 
the groundwork for the region-to-region FTA.  Anaïs Faure, The New Trans-Pacific Partnership, DIPLOMAT, Apr. 5, 
2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/04/the-new-trans-pacific-partnership/. 
272 See Nyshka Chandran, After US Drops TPP, China Joins Member States in Trade Talks, CNBC, Mar. 14, 2017 
(“At least two TPP member countries, Chile and Peru, have also expressed interest in joining RCEP talks.”). 
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“appropriate forms of flexibility, including” SDT provisions and “additional flexibility” accorded 
to LDCs.273  The flexible mechanism is at the core of the legal framework of South-South FTAs, 
but its opaque interpretations run the risk of nullifying the RCEP’s effectiveness.  The APEC 
principle of flexibility highlights the soft-law regime that empowers members to choose their 
liberalization timeframes and exclude sensitive sectors from liberalization.274  The intertwined 
non-discrimination principle, commonly referred to as “open regionalism,” often incurs free-riding 
concern about extending liberalization to non-members.275 
The APEC practice should not be confused with ASEAN’s hard-law notion of flexibility, 
which the RCEP will follow.276  The “ASEAN Minus” formula that crystalized SDT provisions 
allows for flexible participation and avoids the lowest common denominator dilemma under 
conventional South-South FTAs.277  Subject to the Grand Bargain, ASEAN+1 FTAs include 
lengthier yet clearly stipulated liberation timeframes for CLMV countries.278  Entry into force 
provisions of ASEAN+1 FTAs similarly adopted this formula.279 
                                                          
273 Guiding Principles, supra note 44, principle 4; ASEAN Taps on Vision 2025 to Support SDGs, June 25, 2016, 
http://asean.org/asean-taps-on-vision-2025-to-support-sdgs-2/. 
274 The Osaka Action Agenda: Implementation of the Bogor Declaration (1995), at 2. 
275 Id. at 1; see Vinod K. Aggarwal & Elaine Kwei, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): Transregionalism 
with a New Cause?, in INTERREGIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 67, 73 (Heiner Hanggi et al. eds., 2006) 
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The RCEP should further take into account ASEAN’s internal practice.  Article 21 of the 
ASEAN Charter codified the ASEAN Minus modality and confined it to “the implementation of 
economic commitments” that all ASEAN states decided by consensus.280  As the AEC’s services 
liberalization evidences, two or more members could liberalize selected sectors and permit the 
subsequent participation of other nations.281  Unlike APEC, the concessions are only conferred on 
a reciprocal basis in order to eliminate the free rider problem.  Arguably, the ASEAN Minus X 
formula could result in fragmented commitments at divergent speeds.  A legal loophole may exist 
when a state first agrees to its commitments, but then decides to opt out of such commitments after 
finding the implementation difficult.282  Therefore, the RCEP’s elaboration of ASEAN’s flexibility 
rules will not only benefit the AEC, but also serves as a pro-development model for the South-
based FTAs. 
For the sustainability of the mega-regional pact, I propose that the ASEAN Secretariat provide 
institutional support for the RCEP.283  The administrative design is often the last consideration of 
trade negotiators, but is critical to the FTA’s enforcement, monitoring and dispute settlement 
proceedings.  The TPP provisions to create the Committee on Development or the TPP 
Commission failed to consider the practical significance of an impartial, permanent secretariat.284  
It may be suggested that as the RCEP functions as the pathway to the FTAAP, the institutional 
                                                          
280 ASEAN Charter (2007), art. 21.2.  The “ASEAN-X” modality, which is different from “Two Plus X,” can be traced 
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281 Based on the Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (2003), Article IV bis (ASEAN 
Minus X modality) was added to the AFAS.   
282 SEVERINO, supra note 47, at 352-53; Nikomborirak & Jitdumrong, supra note 53, at 59. 
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and other ASEAN states.  Termsak Chalermpalanupap, No Brexit Repeat in ASEAN, DIPLOMAT, 
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mechanism should be based on the APEC Secretariat.  This position does not stand.  Contrary to 
APEC’s assertion to be “an incubator of issues related to the FTAAP by providing leadership,” 
APEC’s role is limited to facilitating RCEP or TPP discussions on the sidelines of APEC 
meetings.285  The FTAAP will only “be realized outside of APEC” because APEC’s soft-law 
mechanism remains unaffected.286   In addition, the absence of treaty-based legal personality 
resulted in APEC’s sui generis status.  As only Singapore law conferred the 60-staff APEC 
Secretariat “the legal capacities of a body corporate,” privileges and immunities cannot be asserted 
in foreign proceedings.287   
Distinctively, the legal standing of ASEAN under the ASEAN Charter is reinforced by the 
conclusion of the ten-country agreement on privileges and immunities.288  The agreement, along 
with the detailed pact concluded between Indonesia and the ASEAN Secretariat, further extends 
functional benefits to “experts on missions for ASEAN” and “permanent missions” of foreign 
nations.289  The RCEP’s mutatis mutandis application in such rules could increase the structural 
efficiency of the mega-regional agreement.  Moreover, for development purposes, the institutional 
memory of the ASEAN Secretariat in enforcing the Initiative for ASEAN Integration that assists 
CLMV countries is indispensable.290  The RCEP could consolidate the funding basis and enhance 
the capacity-building of the Secretariat.  The streamlining of intra-ASEAN initiatives with parallel 
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ASEAN+6 technical assistance projects will collectively narrow the development gap and 
augment the pro-development effect for the Global South. 
V. Conclusion 
Emerging populist isolationism has diverted the path of the neoliberal international economic 
order and cast doubt on the TPP and other trade agreements.  To assess the RCEP’s evolution as a 
new trade architecture in the Asia-Pacific, this article provided the most up-to-date examination of 
the implications of the 16-country mega-FTA for Asian regionalism and the Doha Round.  By 
making interrelated theoretical and substantive claims, the article moved the conventional FTA 
discourse to a new dimension on the assertive legalism of developing nations.  It further shed light 
on the pivotal role of Global South powers in pursing the NREO based on new-generation South-
South FTAs. 
The article argued that the RCEP will galvanize the paradigm change in Third Regionalism 
and provide a normative foundation for the Global South in international economic law.  Achieving 
de jure and de facto integration mandates that the RCEP commitments exceed not only ASEAN+1 
FTAs, but also the AEC under the AEC Blueprint 2025.  To reinforce the new dependency theory, 
this research explored RCEP negotiations vis-à-vis the legal and policy strategies of ASEAN, 
China and India.  Based on ASEAN practice, it reveals multifaceted challenges to tariff 
eliminations that resulted in the noodle bowl syndrome and the liberalization of services, such as 
professional mobility.  The contentious ISDS cases involving ASEAN and the EU’s recent FTAs 
with Asian states were also critically evaluated. 
From a global perspective, the RCEP’s systemic impact on mega-regionals and world trade 
law cannot be ignored.  Based on WTO and VCLT jurisprudence, this article analyzed the new 
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dynamics of trade fragmentation owing to jurisdictional conflicts that arise from overlapping FTAs 
and BITs.  Constructing the RCEP as the pathway to the APEC-based FTAAP is imperative to 
reinvigorate the Doha Round.  The principle of flexibility and the institutional mechanism further 
buttress the pro-development effect of the FTA.  Consequently, these issues are of paramount 
importance to the RCEP’s indispensable position in Asian regionalism and the multilateral trading 
system. 
